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failure to pay earned wages—at alarmingly high rates. Indeed, the
number of wage and hour cases filed in federal and state courts and
administrative agencies steadily increases every year. While much of
the scholarly assessment of wage and hour litigation focuses on large
collective and class actions involving hundreds or thousands of
workers and millions of dollars in lost wages, the experiences of
individual workers with small claims have received little attention.
Furthermore, scholarly consideration of the justice gap in lower
courts, more generally, has often focused on debt collection cases in
which the individual denied justice is the defendant, not the plaintiff.
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This article fills a significant gap in the literature by considering
the experiences of individual low-wage workers who pursue their
claims in the lower courts. In doing so, it identifies the difference
between the law as written and the law as experienced by low-wage
workers seeking to vindicate their substantive legal rights. After
considering the challenges to adjudicating wage and hour cases in
small claims courts, it argues that procedural informality and frequent
absence of critical inquiry into the substantive legal issues create
significant hurdles to low-wage workers’ ability to prevail on their
claims. Indeed, despite the various protections provided by both
federal and state wage and hour laws, courts adjudicating these claims
often apply a breach of contract analysis that disadvantages
vulnerable workers. This return to what I term a pre-New Deal,
Lochnerian approach to wage and hour disputes runs afoul of
Congress and state governments’ efforts to regulate the workplace
and, particularly, to protect vulnerable low-wage workers.
This article argues that the challenge of injecting legal standards
into small claims court requires the creative use of narrative and case
theory to prevail in wage and hour claims. It also considers potential
procedural changes, such as the introduction of specific pleadings and
forms for wage and hour claims and state court judge trainings that
would better enable pro se parties to assert their federal and state
substantive wage and hour rights in small claims courts.
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INTRODUCTION
1

Sonia Morales worked cleaning houses for Marvelous Maids Cleaning
Service (“MMC”) for nearly six months. Each weekday she left her house at 6:40
a.m., driving a van provided by MMC, and picked up a group of coworkers by
7:00 a.m. so they could arrive at MMC by 7:30 a.m. For the next half hour, Ms.
Garza, MMC’s owner, gave the women instructions regarding which homes they
would clean, while also reminding them how lucky they were to have these jobs
due to their immigration status and inability to speak English. At 8:00 a.m., Sonia
and her coworkers departed MMC to begin their long day cleaning five homes.
Breaks were a luxury in which they rarely engaged, as they would further delay
their arrival back home to their families. After cleaning the fifth house, Sonia
dropped her coworkers off at a train station and drove home, typically arriving
after 7:00 p.m. Sonia received $65 dollars per day for this work, regardless of
the number of hours worked, and with no consideration of overtime pay for hours
worked beyond forty in a week. She left MMC frustrated with her underpayment
and inability to find consistent childcare given her frequent late arrivals home in
the evenings.

1. This narrative draws from an American University Washington College of Law Civil
Advocacy Clinic client’s case. While the details reported here are part of the public record, I have
nevertheless changed the client’s name, her employer’s name, and any other identifying information.
The case documents are on file with the author and available upon request.
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She sought assistance at a local worker center that ultimately referred her
to a law school clinic for representation. Sonia and her attorneys calculated that
MMC owed her approximately $2,500 in unpaid wages. They therefore brought
a claim in small claims court against MMC and Ms. Garza for lost wages in
violation of the federal and state wage and hour statutes. The trial included
opening statements; witness testimony by Sonia, Ms. Garza, and an MMC
employee who never worked with Sonia; cross-examination of the witnesses;
and closing statements. At the conclusion of the two-hour trial, the small claims
court judge ruled that Sonia had not met her burden of proving that she had
worked the number of hours she claimed, and found in favor of the defendant.
The appeal of Sonia’s claim—a de novo trial before the Circuit Court—
yielded a different result. After hearing the evidence, the judge retreated to
chambers to consider the case. When he emerged, he engaged in a lengthy
conversation with Sonia’s counsel about the specific statutory violations alleged
and the evidence they believed supported their allegations. Indeed, the judge
stated, “Counsel, I consider myself a fairly intelligent person, and I really try to
understand what people present to me. But, I’m having difficulty understanding
the claims in this case. I’m looking at the law that you cited me and I really need
to be educated here.” Following a series of questions and answers between the
judge and counsel, the judge entered judgment for Sonia, awarding her the wages
she sought.
The testimony provided in the small claims court and circuit court was
substantially similar. But the willingness of the court to engage in an analysis of
the particular statutory violations alleged was drastically different and ultimately
yielded different results.
Wage and hour statutes provide protections for workers, but courts often
fail to enforce them properly. Individual wage theft claims may involve
relatively small amounts of lost wages. Workers must typically file their claims
in small claims courts, which use relaxed procedural rules to accommodate the
large numbers of pro se parties.2 A simplified procedural process, however, often
yields a simplified application of legal concepts. Federal and state wage and hour
laws include many specific protections for workers. Judicial interpretations of
those statues frequently further extend those protections to increase a plaintiff’s
chance of prevailing in litigation and securing significant remedies that
disincentivize wage theft. The statutes advance the public policy goals of
enforcing wage and hour statutes and deterring wage theft by providing for
liquidated and treble damages plus attorneys’ fees and costs. Where workers are

2. These small value claims, often termed “negative value claims,” may, in fact, be so small
that attorneys reliant on attorneys’ fees generated from successful cases may refuse to take them because
the cost of litigation and collection exceed the potential recovery of back-pay and any damages. See,
e.g., Martin H. Redish & Clifford W. Berlow, The Class Action as Political Theory, 85 WASH. U. L.
REV. 753, 762 (2007). Indeed, scholars often point to the ability to group together negative value claims
that plaintiffs would not otherwise pursue as the purpose of class and collective adjudication. See id.
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successful in their claims, lower courts often fail to award more than the base
wages sought. Indeed, liquidated damages, treble damages, and attorneys’ fees
and costs awards are critically important. If the only penalty for failing to pay a
worker is a court eventually ordering the employer to pay the wages due, then
employers often consider wage theft a risk worth taking. Moreover, in the
absence of careful consideration of these statutory protections, workers may face
significant hurdles in proving their claims. The invisibility of the statutory
protections in lower courts risks a return to a Lochner era3 breach of contract
analysis that Congress and many state legislatures have explicitly rejected
through the creation of statutory protections.
This dynamic creates additional hurdles to successfully pursuing wage and
hour claims. The implications for pro se parties with limited, if any, knowledge
of the applicable laws are significant and create challenges to prevailing in wage
and hour claims brought in small claims court. Where employees retain
attorneys, counsel must determine how to insert the various statutory protections
into the simplified process. As such, they construct a narrative of the wage theft
that both explicitly and implicitly captures the compelling story as well as the
law. In the clinical teaching context, the pedagogical challenges inherent in these
processes are complex, as student attorneys grapple with developing these
critical lawyering skills.
In this article, I explore the challenges of enforcing wage and hour statutes
in small claims courts, where courts often fail to consider the specific statutory
protections afforded by the statutes and revert to simplified breach of contract
analyses that ultimately disfavor workers. In Part I, I provide a background on
wage theft and the protections federal and state statutes provide. In particular, I
consider the purposeful distinctions created by statutes to remove wage and hour
claims from a breach of contract framework. In Part II, I explore Lochner v. New
York and the Supreme Court’s early rejection of state statutes that attempted to
regulate employment relationships. I also discuss the inherent challenges in a
contractual analysis of wage and hour violations and contend that absent the
proper enforcement of statutory protections, Lochner’s lasting analytical grip
will undermine worker protections. In Part III, I consider the procedural
mechanisms in lower courts. While simplified procedures are typically framed
as creating docket efficiency and increasing pro se parties’ ability to navigate the
legal process, I argue that simplification of the law thwarts the critically
important intentions of wage and hour laws. In Part IV, I address the need to
employ narrative and case theory strategically in wage and hour cases in small
claims court. I also consider the potential existence of racialized stock stories

3. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). The “Lochner era” refers to the years between
the Supreme Court’s 1905 decision and Congress’s passage of the New Deal in 1938 when the Supreme
Court regularly invalidated states’ efforts to enact wage and hour protections for vulnerable workers.
See, e.g., G. Richard Shell, Contracts in the Modern Supreme Court, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 433, 447 (1993)
(characterizing the Lochner era as 1870 to 1937 followed by the New Deal era).

1308

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 107:1303

that may help or hamper this process. Finally, in Part V, I propose potential
changes to the structure of small claims court and the process for filing wage and
hour claims to ameliorate the challenges identified herein.
I.
WAGE THEFT AND ITS REGULATION: BEYOND THE CONTRACTUAL
RELATIONSHIP
A. Wage Theft Defined
Wage theft, or the failure to pay employees the statutorily required or
agreed-upon wages for hours worked, is a violation of the Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA) as well as various state wage and hour statues, many of which
expand the protections provided under the FLSA.4 It includes not only the
outright failure to compensate an employee, but also the various ways in which
employers may fail to properly compensate employees, including, for example,
the failure to: (1) pay the minimum wage5 or the agreed-upon wage; (2) pay time
and a half for overtime hours;6 (3) pay at all or for all of the hours worked; (4)
pay tips earned; (5) make up the difference between the tipped minimum wage
and the standard minimum wage when tips do not make up the gap between
them.7 Wage theft also includes the failure to properly pay workers based upon
misclassifying them either as exempt from wage and hour laws or as independent
contractors.8

4.

See 29 U.S.C. §§ 206–07 (2012); see also, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 32-1001–15 (West,

2018).
5. The federal minimum wage is $7.25 an hour. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1).
6. See id. § 7(a).
7. The federal tipped minimum wage is $2.13 an hour. Id. § 208(m)(11); 29 C.F.R. § 531.59(a)
(2011). The FLSA permits employers to take a “tip credit” in service industries where workers receive
tips from customers. 29 U.S.C. § 203(m). Employers may then directly pay their employees the $2.13
per hour and make up the difference between $2.13 per hour rate and the $7.25 per hour rate with those
tips, so the employee ultimately receives at least $7.25 per hour. If the tips are not sufficient to make up
the gap, the employer must still make certain the employee ultimately receives the standard minimum
wage. According to various studies and reports, violations of this provision of the FLSA are widespread.
As a result, many service industries employees receive far below the federal minimum wage. See, e.g.,
SARU JAYARAMAN, FORKED 7–11 (2016).
8. See, e.g., Nantiya Ruan, Same Law, Different Day: A Survey of the Last Thirty Years of
Wage Litigation and its Impact on Low-Wage Workers, 30 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 351, 361–62
(2013) (discussing the contours of misclassification cases) [hereinafter Ruan, Same Law, Different Day].
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Wage theft is rampant in the low-wage workforce.9 Scholars and advocates
have identified, analyzed, and discussed its prevalence.10 For example, a 2009
report based upon the survey of 4,387 workers in three major US cities found
that one quarter of the workers did not receive the minimum wage, with 60
percent underpaid by more than one dollar per hour.11 Furthermore, 76 percent
of the workers who reported working more than forty hours the previous week
failed to receive legally required overtime compensation.12
While immigrant low-wage workers, including undocumented workers,
experience particularly high incidents of wage theft,13 the phenomenon is
generally widespread.14 The substantial increase in federal wage and hour
9. See, e.g., KIM BOBO, WAGE THEFT IN AMERICA: WHY MILLIONS OF WORKING
AMERICANS ARE NOT GETTING PAID—AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT (2009); Llezlie Green
Coleman, Procedural Hurdles and Thwarted Efficiency: Immigration Relief in Wage and Hour
Collective Actions, 16 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1, 8–9 (2013) [hereinafter Coleman, Procedural Hurdles
and Thwarted Efficiency]; Matthew W. Finkin, From Weight Checking to Wage Checking: Arming
Workers to Combat Wage Theft, 90 IND. L. J. 851, 853–54 (2015); Matthew Fritz-Mauer, Lofty Laws,
Broken Promises: Wage Theft and the Degradation of Low-Wage Workers, 20 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP.
POL’Y J. 71, 95 (2016); Ruth Milkman et al., Wage and Hour Violations in Urban Labour Markets: A
Comparison of Los Angeles, New York and Chicago, 43 INDUS. REL. J. 378, 379 (2012) (discussing a
study that found pervasive wage theft in the nation’s three largest urban labor markets); Nantiya Ruan,
Facilitating Wage Theft: How Courts Use Procedural Rules to Undermine Substantive Rights of LowWage Workers, 63 VAND. L. REV. 727–28 (2010) (“If the rising numbers of lawsuits against major
corporate employers is any indication, the United States is suffering a crisis of wage theft against its
workers.”); Ross Eisenbrey, Wage Theft is a Bigger Problem Than Other Theft—But Not Enough is
Done to Protect Workers, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Apr. 2, 2014), http://www.epi.org/publication/wagetheft-bigger-problem-theft-protect [https://perma.cc/K44T-MB86] (“Survey research shows that well
over two-thirds of low-wage workers have been the victims of wage theft, but the governmental
resources to help them recover their lost wages are scant and largely ineffective.”).
10. See, e.g., BOBO, supra note 9; NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, WINNING WAGE JUSTICE: A
SUMMARY OF RESEARCH ON WAGE AND HOUR VIOLATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES (2013),
http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/2015/03/WinningWageJusticeSummaryofResearchonWageTheft
.pdf [https://perma.cc/8HSF-AHGT]; Llezlie Green Coleman, Exploited at the Intersection: A Critical
Race Feminist Analysis of Undocumented Latina Workers and the Role of the Private Attorney General,
22 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 397, 402–05 (2015) [hereinafter Coleman, Exploited at the Intersection];
Llezlie Green Coleman, Rendered Invisible: African American Low-Wage Workers and the Workplace
Exploitation Paradigm, 60 HOW. L. J. 61, 100–02 (2016) [hereinafter Coleman, Rendered Invisible];
Omer Kimhi, Getting More Than Justice on Paper: Bankruptcy Priorities and the Crisis of Unpaid
Wages, 44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 107, 113 (2015) (describing wage theft as an epidemic); Stephen Lee,
Policing Wage Theft in the Day Labor Market, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 655, 668 (2014); Ruan, Same
Law, Different Day, supra note 8.
11. ANNETTE BERNHARDT ET AL., BROKEN LAWS, UNPROTECTED WORKERS: VIOLATIONS OF
EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAWS IN AMERICA’S CITIES 2 (2009) https://www.nelp.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/03/BrokenLawsReport2009.pdf [https://perma.cc/296H-CYF8].
12. Id.; see also Andrew Friedman & Deborah Axt, In Defense of Dignity, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 577, 577–78 (2010) (noting that seventy-six percent of low-wage workers who work more than
forty hours per week do not receive the legally mandated time-and-a-half overtime rate).
13. See Coleman, Exploited at the Intersection, supra note 10, at 402–03; Coleman, Procedural
Hurdles and Thwarted Efficiency, supra note 9, at 6–7. Workers’ rights advocate Kim Bobo explains
that the lack of a rational immigration policy in concert with economic desperation and fear of
deportation make undocumented workers particularly vulnerable to employers withholding their wages.
See BOBO, supra note 9, at 59–60.
14. See Coleman, Rendered Invisible, supra note 10.
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claims—including collective and class actions often involving hundreds or
thousands of workers15—in addition to various worker advocates’ reports and
scholarly articles describing the phenomenon,16 demonstrate the magnitude of
the problem. While cases involving large employers like Wal-Mart or Tyson’s
Foods17 may receive attention in the media and are more likely to be subject to
scholarly inquiry, wage theft experienced by individual workers in
comparatively small amounts by small employers seems hidden from sight.
Employers with twenty or fewer employees, however, are more likely than their
larger counterparts to violate the wage and hour laws.18
Even a seemingly small amount of wage theft has a significant impact on
low-wage or minimum wage workers. As the Economic Policy Institute
explained:
When a worker earns only a minimum wage ($290 for a 40-hour week),
shaving a mere half hour a day from the paycheck means a loss of more
than $1,400 a year, including overtime premiums. That could be . . . the
difference between paying the rent and utilities or risking eviction and
the loss of gas, water, or electric service.19
Where the state minimum wage is significantly higher than the federal
minimum wage,20 the losses are even more substantial.

15. See, e.g., Lydia DePillis, Why Wage and Hour Litigation is Skyrocketing, WASH. POST,
(Nov. 25, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/11/25/people-are-suing-morethan-ever-over-wages-and-hours/?utm_term=.5e265ad2930c [https://perma.cc/YF7K-SU29].
16. See, e.g., BERNHARDT, supra note 11, at 2 (discussing the National Employment Law
Program’s study finding low-wage workers experienced frequent minimum wage and overtime
compensation violations); Friedman & Axt, supra note 12, at 577–78 (finding that over a quarter of lowwage workers are paid less than minimum wage and that 76 percent of low-wage workers eligible for
statutorily-required overtime compensation based on the number of hours they worked each week fail
to actually receive it).
17. See, e.g., Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S.Ct. 1036 (2016) (summarized in Kevin
McGown, Justices Uphold Class Action in Tyson Workers’ Wage Case, BLOOMBERG LAW (Mar. 23,
2016), https://www.bna.com/justices-uphold-class-n57982068892 [https://perma.cc/C2PW-CQNT]);
Braun v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 106 A.3d 656 (Pa. 2014) (summarized in Wal-Mart Must Pay $188
Million in Workers’ Class Action, REUTERS BUS. NEWS (Dec. 16, 2014),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-walmart-lawsuit/wal-mart-must-pay-188-million-in-workers-classaction-idUSKBN0JU1XJ20141216 [https://perma.cc/Y6NQ-EGGW]).
18. See Finkin, supra note 910, at 852 (“Smaller employers, those with twenty or fewer
employees, were more likely to violate the law . . . .”).
19. Brady Meixell & Ross Eisenbrey, An Epidemic of Wage Theft is Costing Workers Hundreds
of Millions of Dollars a Year, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Sept. 11, 2014),
http://www.epi.org/publication/epidemic-wage-theft-costing-workers-hundreds/
[https://perma.cc/V5PM-UBYA].
20. In the District of Columbia, for example, the minimum wage is currently $14.00 per hour
and is set to rise 70 cents per year until it reaches $15 per hour in 2020. See Aaron C. Davis, D.C. Gives
Final Approval to $15 Minimum Wage, WASH. POST (June 21, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/dc-politics/dc-gives-final-approval-to-15-minimumwage/2016/06/21/920ae156-372f-11e6-8f7c-d4c723a2becb_story.html?utm_term=.28e4f7768aa5
[https://perma.cc/RD7B-V7CL].
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Some scholars have argued that the overall financial impact of wage theft
is greater than criminal theft.21 Indeed, Elizabeth Kennedy characterized wage
theft as public larceny and argued for the imposition of creative penalties to deter
the practice more effectively.22 Others have advocated for the creation of
criminal penalties for wage theft in response to the depth and breadth of the
problem.23
Accordingly, employers’ failure to properly compensate employees in
violation of federal and state wage and hour laws has become axiomatic in the
work experiences of low-wage workers. The enforcement of these statutes,
including the awarding of back pay, compensatory damages, and attorneys’ fees,
is critical to deterring wage theft.
Weak enforcement of the wage and hour provisions make non-compliance
attractive to employers. If the only penalty for the violation requires the employer
to pay what it would have otherwise paid, “there is no reason why the employer
would not cheat: the consequence of being caught, economically speaking,
would render the employer no worse off than having complied to begin with.”24
As a result, federal and state wage and hour statutes, and the jurisprudence
interpreting them, create not only substantive and procedural protections, but
also additional damages beyond merely the unpaid wages.
B. Worker Protections: Statutory and Jurisprudential
Congress enacted the FLSA in 1938 as part of the New Deal legislation that
extended federal regulation to workers.25 Despite the Roosevelt Administration’s
full backing of the bill introducing the FLSA,26 it generated vigorous debate.27

21. For example, Ross Eisenbrey compared the value of wages improperly withheld from
workers in 2012 ($280 million) with the money lost through robberies that year ($139 million) to reach
the conclusion that wage theft “is a far bigger problem than bank robberies, convenience store robberies,
street and highway robberies, and gas station robberies combined.” Eisenbrey, supra note 9.
22. See Elizabeth J. Kennedy, Wage Theft as Public Larceny, 81 BROOK. L. REV. 517, 540
(2016).
23. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 10, at 663–64.
24. Finkin, supra note 9, at 855.
25. See Juan F. Perea, The Echoes of Slavery: Recognizing the Racist Origins of the Agricultural
and Domestic Worker Exclusion from the National Labor Relations Act, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 95, 104
(2011). Under the New Deal, Congress enacted various social safety net programs, including the
National Industrial Recovery Act, Social Security Act, Agricultural Adjustment Act, Social Security
Act, and Fair Labor Standards Act. See id.
26. See Bill Quigley, Primer on Minimum-Wage and Overtime Issues Under the Fair Labor
Standards Act for Low-Wage Workers and Their Advocates, 29 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 925 (1996).
27. This debate included active consideration of the Southern Democrats’ opposition to
extending the same workplace rights to black and white workers. This debate resulted in the exclusion
from the statute of occupations with high percentages of black workers, such as agricultural workers and
domestic workers. See, e.g., Baher Azmy, Unshackling the Thirteenth Amendment: Modern Slavery and
a Reconstructed Civil Rights Agenda, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 981, 1038–47 (2002); Llezlie Green
Coleman, Disrupting the Discrimination Narrative: An Argument for Wage and Hour Laws’ Inclusion
in Antisubordination Advocacy, 14 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 49, 79 (2018) [hereinafter Coleman, Disrupting
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Among other things, the Act created a federal minimum wage of twenty-five
cents per hour for workers engaged in interstate commerce28 and instituted the
forty-hour workweek and the right to overtime compensation (1.5 times the
hourly rate) for hours worked beyond forty in a workweek.29
Since its enactment, various amendments to the statute, as well as
jurisprudential interpretation of the statute, have further strengthened worker
protections. The following section walks through many of the protections that
enhance and support workers’ ability to enforce their substantive wage and hour
rights.
1. Liquidated Damages
Employers that violate the FLSA are not only liable for the wages owed,
but also liquidated damages equal to the amount of wages lost.30 Furthermore,
these damages are not discretionary; rather, the statute provides that employers
who fail to pay minimum wage and overtime “shall be liable to the employee . . .
in the amount of their unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime
compensation . . . and in an additional equal amount as liquidated
damages . . .”31 These damages are not punitive; rather, they are compensatory.32
Congress intended them to compensate workers for the financial losses that
attach to wage theft—such as lost housing and late fees for late debt and housing
payments—without requiring that the worker attempt to calculate the financial
impact of the wage theft with specificity.33 While liquidated damages for FLSA
violations are presumptive,34 an employer may avoid the payment by
demonstrating that it acted with “good faith and . . . had reasonable grounds” in
failing to comply with the FLSA.35 This burden, however, is difficult to meet
and “double damages are the norm, single damages the exception . . . .”36

the Discrimination Narrative]; Marc Linder, Farm Workers and the Fair Labor Standards Act: Racial
Discrimination in the New Deal, 65 TEX. L. Rev. 1335, 1371–80 (1987); Perea, supra note 25, at 114.
28. See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–19 (2012); Quigley, supra note
26, at 927.
29. See GEORGE E. PAULSEN, A LIVING WAGE FOR THE FORGOTTEN MAN: THE QUEST FOR
FAIR LABOR STANDARDS, 1933–41 (1996).
30. See 29 U.S.C. § 211. Maryland and Washington, D.C. likewise provide for additional
damages above the lost wages for violations of their wage and hour statutes. See MD. CODE. ANN., LAB.
& EMPL. § 3-507.2 (West 2010); D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-1331.09(a)(1) (West 2013).
31. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
32. Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 707 (1945). The Court explained these
damages constitute “compensation for the retention of a workman’s pay which might result in damages
too obscure and difficult of proof for estimate other than by liquidated damages.” Id.; see also Martin v.
Cooper Elec. Supply Co., 940 F.2d 896, 907 (3d Cir. 1991).
33. Overnight Motor Transp. Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572, 583 (1942) (finding the FLSA
provides “compensation, not a penalty or punishment, by the Government”).
34. See Reich v. Southern New Eng. Telecomms. Corp., 121 F.3d 58, 71 (2d. Cir. 1997).
35. 29 U.S.C. § 260.
36. Kinney v. D.C., 994 F.2d 6, 12 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (citing Walton v. United Consumers Club,
Inc., 786 F.2d 303, 310 (7th Cir. 1986)).
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2. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs
The FLSA and many of its state law equivalents defy the American rule
that parties bear their own costs of litigation,37 and instead provide that the
prevailing party in litigation may collect reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.38
These fees are an integral part of the statute and necessary for its consistent
private enforcement.39
Some small claims courts, however, limit the amount of attorneys’ fees
recoverable in cases before their courts. The District of Columbia, for example,
limits the recovery of attorneys’ fees to 15 percent of the plaintiff’s recovery.40
Given the $10,000 jurisdictional limit on claims, the maximum award
contemplated by the court is $1,500. This restriction creates a substantial
deterrent to private attorney representation of workers in that court, given the
number of hours necessary to adequately represent a worker in wage and hour
litigation.41 Such a requirement also creates a perverse incentive for an attorney
to put minimal effort into a case (that is, $1,500 of effort) because she will be
unable to collect her entire fee. The implications for attorneys’ duty of zealous

37. See Catherine R. Albiston & Laura Beth Nielsen, The Procedural Attack on Civil Rights:
The Empirical Reality of Buckhannon for the Private Attorney General, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1087, 1093
(2007) (discussing the history of trial courts waiving the American Rule, the Supreme Court’s rejection
of this practice, and Congress’ creation of the statutory right to attorneys’ fee-shifting clauses).
38. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (“The court in such action shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to
the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney’s fee to be paid by the defendant, and costs of the
action.”).
39. Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (“If successful plaintiffs
were routinely forced to bear their own attorneys’ fees, few aggrieved parties would be in a position to
advance the public interest by invoking the injunctive powers of the federal courts. Congress therefore
enacted the provision for counsel fees . . . .”); see, e.g., Fegley v. Higgins, 19 F.3d 1126, 1134 (6th Cir.
1994) (noting the “purpose of the FLSA attorney fees provision is ‘to insure [sic] effective access to the
judicial process by providing attorney fees for prevailing plaintiffs with wage and hour grievances’”).
Some courts recognize that the amount of attorneys’ fees collected in a case may far exceed the amount
of the worker’s unpaid wages. See Howe v. Hoffman-Curtis Partners Ltd. 215 Fed. App’x. 341, 342 (5th
Cir. 2007) (“Given the nature of claims under the FLSA, it is not uncommon that attorney fee requests
can exceed the amount of judgment in the case by many multiples.”).
40. D.C. SUPER. CT. R. PROC. SMALL CLS. & CONCILIATION BRANCH R. 19 (“Except for
exceptional circumstances made known to the judge in open court, attorney’s fees in this Branch may
not be allowed in an amount exceeding 15 percent of the plaintiff’s recovery”). Furthermore, the rules
plainly fail to contemplate the provision of attorneys’ fees in cases alleging violations of fee-shifting
statutes, like the FLSA and its state counterparts. Rule 19 does not allow attorneys’ fees unless the
attorney certifies “that the fee claimed is payable only and entirely to him, and that he has no agreement
with the plaintiff and will make none whereby any part for such attorney’s fees will be payable to anyone
other than such attorney.” Id. The fee-shifting statutes, however, contemplate that the fee is awardable
to the party (who then typically pays the attorney). D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-1308 (West 2017) (providing
attorneys’ fees and costs shall be awarded to the prevailing parties in cases alleging violations of the
Minimum Wage Act, the Sick and Safe Leave Act, or the Living Wage Act).
41. For example, even at a very low billable rate of $150 per hour, it is implausible that an
attorney could conduct multiple interviews of the client, engage in fact investigation, develop a case
theory, draft a complaint, arrange for service, participate in the initial hearing and mediation, prepare for
trial (including preparing the client and witnesses for testimony), and try the case for a total of ten billable
hours.
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advocacy are clear. In addition, this limit in recoverable attorneys’ fees is in
direct contravention of D.C.’s wage and hour statute that provides that the court
shall award a prevailing plaintiff attorney fees computed consistent with the
matrix approved in Salazar v. District of Columbia and “updated to account for
the current market hourly rates for attorney’s services.”42
3. Recordkeeping Requirement
Section 11(c) of the FLSA requires employers make and maintain records
of their employees and of their “wages, hours, and other conditions and practices
of employment.”43 The statute does not require employers to maintain the
records in a specific form or format.44 However, it identifies a relatively specific
list of employee information employers must keep, including the hours worked
each day, the total hours worked in a work week, the total daily or weekly
straight-time wages, the regularly hourly rate of pay for any workweek in which
overtime compensation was due, the total wages paid each pay period, and the
date payment was made and the pay period covered by that payment.45
No private right of action exists to enforce the statutory recordkeeping
requirements.46 There are, however, jurisprudentially created litigation penalties
for violations. For example, courts have found the failure to keep required
records may constitute evidence that the employer’s failure to pay the minimum
wage or overtime compensation was willful.47

42. 123 F. Supp. 2d 8 (D.D.C. 2000); D.C. Wage Theft Prevention Act, D.C. Act § 20-426
(2014) (codified as D.C. Law § 20-157 (2015)).
43. 29 U.S.C. § 211(c) (2012); see also 29 C.F.R. § 516.1 (2018).
44. Brock v. Wilamowsky, 833 F.2d 11, 19 (1987) (quoting Walton v. United Consumers Club,
Inc., 786 F.2d 303, 310 (7th Cir. 1986)).
45. 29 C.F.R. § 516.2. The FLSA requires that employers maintain additional records for
specific types of employees, such as tipped workers, domestic service employees, and industrial
homeworkers. Id. § 516.28(a); id. § 552.110(a); id. § 516.31(b)(2). For example, employers of tipped
employees must also maintain records with: a notation on the pay records that identifies employees
whose wages include tips, weekly or monthly amounts of tips the employee reports or receives, the
amount by which tips have increased the employees pay, the hours worked each workday in which the
employee did not work in an occupation that receives tips and the employer’s total payment for those
hours, and the same for each workday the employee worked in an occupation that receives tips. Id.
§ 516.28(a).
46. See Castillo v. Givens, 704 F.2d 181, 198 n.41 (5th Cir. 1983) (“Although FLSA requires
all agricultural employees to maintain payroll records showing the hours worked . . . it contains no
private enforcement mechanism if the employer fails to maintain such records.”) cert. denied, 464 U.S.
850 (1983); East v. Bullock’s, Inc., 34 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1183 (D. Ariz. 1998) (“[G]iven the existence
of other private rights of action under FLSA, it appears that Congress did not intend to provide a private
right to enforce § 215(a)(5).”); Bureerong v. Uvawas, 922 F. Supp. 1450, 1471 (C.D. Cal. 1996)
(“Neither the FLSA nor the regulations implementing it expressly create a private right of action to
enforce § 215(a)(5) or regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Labor.”); O’Quinn v. Chambers
County, 636 F. Supp. 1388, 1392 (S.D. Tex. 1986) (“Private causes of action under the FLSA are
established in §216 which does not provide a cause of action for violation of § 211.”).
47. See Elwell v. Univ. Hosps. Home Care Servs., 276 F.3d 832, 844 (6th Cir. 2002) (finding it
would have been proper for the court to instruct the jury that it could consider the failure to maintain
records when determining whether the failure to pay overtime was willful); Jacobsen v. Stop & Shop
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4. Notice Posting
The FLSA requires employers to post various notices in the workplace that
alert workers to their statutory wage and hour rights.48 Some courts have found
that employers’ failure to post the required notices may toll the two-year statute
of limitations period.49 This tolling period may be particularly important where,
for example, a worker has difficulty obtaining counsel or taking the time away
from work to engage in the steep learning curve necessary for successful pro se
representation.
5. Burden-Shifting in the Absence of Documents
In Anderson Mt. Clemens Pottery, the Supreme Court created critically
important litigation protections for workers whose employers fail to maintain
records. First, the Court opined that where an employer fails to maintain records,
the plaintiff need only demonstrate by “just and reasonable inference” that she
was an employee, she worked the hours, and the employer failed to pay her.50
The “just and reasonable inference” standard is reasonably easy to meet through
client testimony51 and plainly more lenient than the “more likely than not”
standard used in many small claims court cases.52 Once the employee makes that
showing, the burden then shifts to the employer to rebut the inference.53 The D.C.
Circuit has described this rebuttal standard as requiring the employer to “pinpoint
evidence of the precise amount of work performed or to negative the
reasonableness of the inferences to be drawn from the [employee’s] evidence,”54
and described this burden as “significant.”55

Supermarket Co., 2003 WL 21136308, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 15, 2003) (“[F]ailure to keep the records
required by the Department of Labor regulations for non-exempt employees . . . may permit a finding
of willfulness.”).
48. 29 C.F.R. § 516.4.
49. See, e.g., Cortez v. Medina’s Landscaping Inc., 2002 WL 31175471, at *6 (N.D. Ill., Sept.
30, 2002) (holding that an employer’s failure to post the FLSA Notice tolls the statute of limitations
period until the worker acquires “general awareness” of her rights under the FLSA). But see Viciedo v.
New Horizons Computer Learning Ctr. of Columbus, Ltd., 246 F. Supp. 2d 886, 904 (S.D. Ohio 2003)
(“[E]mployer’s failure to post [an FLSA] notice . . . does not necessarily toll the statute of limitations.”).
50. Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 687 (1946).
51. See, e.g., supra Introduction (discussion of small claims court judge’s ruling in the Sonia
Morales).
52. See, e.g., Dole v. Tony & Susan Alamo Found., 915 F.2d 349, 351 (8th Cir. 1990) (finding
employee’s credible testimony alone was sufficient to meet the just and reasonable inference standard);
Brock v. Seto, 790 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1986). But see, Rosales v. Lore, 149 F. App’x 245–46 (5th
Cir. 2005) (holding that the employee failed to establish hours worked by a just and reasonable inference
where his claims that he worked 12-hour days strained credibility).
53. Anderson, 328 U.S. at 687–88.
54. Dove v. Coupe, 759 F.2d 167, 174–75 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
55. Blake v. CMB Const., 1993 WL 840278, at *5 (D.N.H. Mar. 30, 1993) (“The burden placed
upon the employer is a significant one[.]”).
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Furthermore, the Court specifically contemplated that a worker may not
have documentary evidence, and that the resulting damages awarded may be
inexact.56 Indeed, the Court explained:
The employer cannot be heard to complain that the damages lack the
exactness and precision of measurement that would be possible had he
kept records in accordance with the requirements of § 11(c) of the
Act. . . . Nor is such a result to be condemned by the rule that precludes
the recovery of uncertain and speculative damages. That rule applies
only to situations where the fact of damage is itself uncertain. But here
we are assuming that the employee has proved that he has performed
work and has not been paid in accordance with the statute. The damage
is therefore certain. The uncertainty lies only in the amount of damages
arising from the statutory violation by the employer. In such a case, “it
would be a perversion of fundamental principles of justice to deny all
relief to the injured person, and thereby relieve the wrongdoer from
making any amend for his acts.”57
The Supreme Court has thus made clear that an employer should not benefit
from a failure to maintain records and that such a practice places the employee
at a significant disadvantage in litigation. A small claims court that is accustomed
to applying the “more likely than not” burden of proof to a plaintiff’s claim and
typically requires a higher level of specificity in determining damages would be
much more likely to deny relief to worker under those higher standards, than the
standard articulated by the Supreme Court.58
6. Individual Liability for Directors and Supervisors
Individual corporate officers may also face liability for FLSA violations.59
FLSA broadly defines an employee as “any individual employed by an
employer,” and employer as “includ[ing] any person acting directly or indirectly
in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee . . . .”60 Courts have
consistently determined that corporate individuals who meet one of the following
criteria are employers subject to statutory liability: “(1) operational control, (2)
substantial role in setting personnel policies and/or control over the employees,

56. Anderson, 328 U.S. at 688.
57. Id. at 688. See also, Marc Linder, Class Struggle at the Door: The Origins of the Portal -toPortal Act of 1947, 39 BUFF. L. REV. 53, 109–10 (1991) (discussing Mt. Clemens’ procedural
innovations and noting the record-keeping and burden-shifting process was the only one that survived
future congressional action).
58. While the Mt. Clemens Pottery decision applies to FLSA claims, many state courts have
held that their state wage and hour statutes should be interpreted consistent with the FLSA. See, e.g.,
Hernandez v. Stringer, 210 F. Supp. 3d 54, 59 (D.D.C. 2016); McFeeley v. Jackson Street Entm’t, LLC,
47 F. Supp. 3d 260, 267 (D. Md. 2014); Randolph v. PowerComm Const., Inc., 7 F. Supp. 3d 561, 568
(D. Md. 2014); Thompson v. Linda & A., Inc., 779 F. Supp. 2d 139, 146 (D.D.C. 2011).
59. Some state statutes also hold corporate shareholders accountable for unpaid wages. See, e.g.,
N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 630 (2016); Wisc. Stat. § 180.0622 (2016).
60. 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (2012).
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and/or (3) knowing participation in the violation.”61 As such, workers may seek
relief against individual supervisors and corporate officers as joint employers
along with the corporate entity.62 This ability is often critically important in
enforcing judgments in wage theft cases, particularly those against the smaller
companies that typify the defendants in small claims court wage theft cases.
Corporations may declare bankruptcy, reorganize, or more easily hide their
assets than individuals.63 For example, the Ninth Circuit found the corporate
defendant’s bankruptcy and resulting stay would not insulate the individual
managers from liability under the FLSA.64 Furthermore, it is easier for a
corporation than for an individual to recover from the impact of a judgment on
their credit. A corporate body can dissolve and reemerge with a new corporate
identity. As such, federal and some state wage and hour laws contemplate the
piercing of the corporate veil to reach the decision-makers and create a greater
possibility of actually recovering the unpaid wages.65 This individual liability
also creates an additional incentive for compliance with the wage and hour laws.
Indeed, individual managers and corporate officers may be less inclined to
withhold wages where their individual assets are at risk.66
7. Independent Contractors
The wage and hour laws apply to “employees” as defined in the statutes.67
Employers, however, may improperly characterize workers as “independent

61. See Hina Shah, Broadening Low-Wage Workers’ Access to Justice: Guaranteeing Unpaid
Wages in Targeted Industries, 28 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMPL. L. J. 9, 30 (2010).
62. Timothy P. Glynn, Taking Self-Regulation Seriously: High-Ranking Officer Sanctions for
Work-Law Violations, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 279, 324–25 (2011) (The FLSA providing “that
officers with supervisory control may be deemed ‘employers’ under the statute and, hence, vicariously
liable as if they were the employing enterprise”).
63. Public policy organizations and practitioners report that workers fail to collect a significant
percentage of wage theft judgements because the employers disappear, hide assets, or file for
bankruptcy. See Kimhi, supra note 10, at 108–09. To combat this phenomenon, Kimhi argues for the
creation of an insurance-based solution that would require employers to pay into a fund from which
employees who prevail in wage theft cases could collect their judgments. See id. at 109.
64. Boucher v. Shaw, 572 F.3d 1087, 1093 (9th Cir. 2009).
65. See Shah, supra note 61, at 22; see also Avila v. Caring Hearts & Hands Assisted Living &
Elder Care, LLC, No. TDC-15-3943, 2016 WL 4083365, at *3–4 (D. Md. Aug. 1, 2016); Dana M. Muir
& Cindy A. Schipani, The Intersection of State Corporation Law and Employee Compensation
Programs: Is It Curtains For Veil Piercing?, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 1059, 1112 (1996).
66. This incentive, however, may be more effective where the employers are “fly-by-night labor
contractors and other undercapitalized firms” from whom recovery of a judgment may be difficult.
Glynn, supra note 62, at 325. It may have less efficacy with solvent employers who may indemnify or
insure supervisors against a successful wage theft claim. See id.
67. See 29 U.S.C. § 203 (2010) (defining the term employee as “any individual employed by an
employer”); see, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-1002(1) (West 2018) (defining employees as persons the
employer suffered to permit or permitted to work). Other states do not specifically define the term
employee. Maryland, for example, does not specifically define the term employee, but applies the
economic realities test to determine whether individuals are employees. See MD. CODE ANN., LAB. &
EMP. § 3-507 (West 2018).
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contractors.”68 An independent contractor does not benefit from the legal
protections provided by the wage and hour laws.69 As a result, employers will
misclassify workers as independent contractors, rather than employees, in order
to avoid the various statutory responsibilities that attach to the employment
relationship.70
Indeed, in Sonia Morales’s case discussed in the introduction,71 the
employer testified that she paid Sonia a standard amount per week rather than an
hourly rate, that she did not keep track of the number of hours worked each week,
and that she ultimately treated Sonia as an independent contractor because Sonia
agreed to this arrangement.72 In other words, she argued Sonia was an
independent contractor because she agreed to this contractual relationship.
Workers, however, cannot bargain away or waive their wage and hour rights,73
as doing so destabilizes wage and hour statutes and the important public policy
goals tied to their regular enforcement.74
Courts typically use the “economic realities test” to determine whether a
worker is an employee, and therefore covered by wage and hour laws, or an
independent contractor who has entered into a contractual relationship rather
than an employment relationship.75 The multi-factor economic realities test
incudes an assessment of: (1) the employer’s level of control over the worker;
68. See, e.g., Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, From Amazon to Uber: Defining Employment in the
Modern Economy, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1673, 1684 (2016).
69. Worker and unemployment compensation laws, as well as Social Security and disability
benefits, exclude independent contractors from coverage. See Elizabeth J. Kennedy, When the Shop
Floor is in the Living Room: Toward a Domestic Employment Relationship Theory, 67 N.Y.U. ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 643, 658–59 (2012); see also Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 68, at 1684.
70. See e.g., Katherine V.W. Stone, Legal Protectors for Atypical Employees: Employment Law
for Workers Without Workplaces and Employees Without Employers, 27 BERKELEY J. EMPL. & LAB.
251, 262 (2006) (explaining how employers sometimes attempt to avoid coverage of various antidiscrimination statutes by classifying their workers as independent contractors); see also Hunt v. Mo.
Dep’t of Corr., 297 F.3d 735, 741–42 (8th Cir. 2002) (explaining how courts determine whether a party
is an “independent contractor” and an “employee” and holding that plaintiffs were misclassified as
“independent contractors”); Heath v. Perdue Farms, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 2d 452, 458 (D. Md. 2000)
(describing facts suggesting Perdue’s misclassification of workers as independent contractors rather than
employees).
71. See supra Introduction.
72. See Transcript on file with author, at 35-40.
73. See Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 706–07 (1945).
74. See id. at 706.
75. Shirley Lung asserts courts have used different versions of an economic realities test, which
she characterizes as based on either control or contract theories of employment. Shirley Lung, Exploiting
the Joint Employer Doctrine: Providing a Break for Sweatshop Garment Workers, 34 LOY. U. CHI. L.J.
291, 318–19 (2003); see also Herman v. RSR Security Services Ltd., 172 F.3d 132, 139 (2d Cir. 1999)
(discussing the economic realities test); Baystate Alt. Staffing, Inc. v. Herman, 163 F.3d 668, 675 (1st
Cir. 1998); Dole v. Snell, 875 F.2d 802, 804–05 (10th Cir. 1989) (discussing and applying a five-factor
economic realities test); Brock v. Superior Care, Inc., 840 F.2d 1054, 1058–59 (2d Cir. 1988) (discussing
and applying a five-factor economic realities test); Sec’y of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1534–
35 (7th Cir. 1987) (discussing and applying a six-factor economic realities test); Carter v. Dutchess
Cmty. Coll., 735 F.2d 8, 12 (2d Cir. 1984) (discussing and applying a four-factor “economic reality”
test).
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(2) the worker’s opportunity for profit or loss; (3) the worker’s capital investment
in the process; (4) the skill necessary to perform the job; (5) whether the job is
integral to the business’s operation; (6) whether the relationship between the
worker and employer is permanent.76 No single factor is dispositive and not all
the factors need to weigh in favor of the employment relationship in order for
the court to find the existence of an employment relationship.77 Courts, however,
consider “economic dependence” the central focus of the inquiry and use the
factors to guide the analysis.78
C. Additional Protections Under State Statutes
Many state statutes have expanded the protections provided by the FLSA
in an effort to further their wage and hour laws’ efficacy. State wage and hour
statutes provide worker protections without the need for them to engage in
interstate commerce. Moreover, many state wage and hour statutes build upon
the FLSA and provide additional penalties for non-compliance. For example, the
Maryland wage and hour laws provide for treble, rather than liquidated
damages.79 The District of Columbia’s recent amendment to its wage and hour
laws created a right for workers to recover four times their owed wages for
violations of the Wage Payment and Collection Act.80
Recent amendments to the District of Columbia and Maryland’s wage and
hour laws also created automatic joint and several liability under the statute for
contractors and subcontractors where the worker alleges he or she did not receive
proper payment for hours worked.81 A frequent narrative in construction worker
76. Benjamin Means & Joseph A. Seiner, Navigating the Uber Economy, 49 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1511, 1526 (2016); Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Fact Sheet No. 13: Employment
Relationship
Under
the
Fair
Labor
Standards
Act
(FLSA)
(July
2008),
https://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs13.htm [https://perma.cc/U5BL-YCER].
77. See, e.g., Usery v. Pilgrim Equip. Co., 527 F.2d 1308, 1311 (5th Cir. 1976) (“No one of
these considerations can become the final determinant, nor can the collective answers to all of the
inquiries produce a resolution which submerges consideration of the dominant factor—economic
dependence.”).
78. See, e.g., Scantland v. Knight, Inc., 721 F.3d 1308, 1312 (11th Cir. 2013); Usery, 527 F.2d
at 1311; see also Werner v. Bell Family Med. Ctr., Inc. 529 Fed. App’x 541, 543 (6th Cir. 2013) (noting
centrality of economic dependence to the “economic reality” test); Schultz v. Capital Intern. Sec., Inc.,
466 F.3d 298, 305 (4th Cir. 2006) (“No single factor is dispositive . . . The test is designed to capture the
economic realities of the relationship between the worker and the putative employer.”); Brock, 840 F.2d
at 1059 (explaining that “[n]o one of these factors is dispositive; rather, the test is based on a totality of
the circumstances”).
79. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-1303(4) (West 2017); id. at § 2-220.08 (West 2013); MD. CODE
ANN. LAB. & EMP. § 3-507.2 (West 2017).
80. D.C. Wage Theft Prevention Act, D.C. Act § 20-426(i) (2014) (providing an employer that
violates the wage and hour statute “shall be liable to the employee in the amount of the unpaid wages,
statutory penalties, and additional amount as liquidated damages equal to treble the amount of unpaid
wages”).
81. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-1012(c) (“A subcontractor, including any intermediate
subcontractor, and the general contractor shall be jointly and severally liable to the subcontractor’s
employees for the subcontractor’s violations of this chapter.”); MD. CODE ANN., LABOR & EMPL. § 3507.2(c)(2) (“In an action brought under subsection (a) of this section, a general contractor on a project
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cases progresses as follows: The workers’ claim that they did not receive proper
payment for the hours worked on a project that involves both contractors and
subcontractors. The subcontractor, who likely hired the workers, but may share
supervision of the workers’ daily duties with the contractor, claims that they have
not been able to pay the worker because the contractor has not paid them. The
contractor claims to have made all of the required payments to the subcontractor
for the work and that, regardless, the contractor did not actually employ the
workers. In this way, both the contractor and subcontractor play a game of “not
me,” disclaiming liability and pointing at one another.82 While workers’ lawyers
have long made claims of joint and several liability between the contractor and
subcontractor, the need to prove the various elements of such a claim83 takes time
and resources, and is not always successful.84 Perhaps recognizing this reality,
the District of Columbia has removed this legal hurdle from the workers’ pursuit
of wage theft claims in construction and shifted the burden to the companies.
II.
BREACH OF CONTRACT AND LOCHNER’S HISTORICAL HOLD ON WORKPLACE
REGULATION
A. Lochner v. New York
Prior to the enactment of the FLSA, and the other New Deal statutes,
workplace disputes resided solely in the realm of contract law. In the seminal
case, Lochner v. New York, the Court found unconstitutional a New York labor
law that regulated the number of hours bakers could work and held that the
statute unnecessarily and unreasonably interfered with the individual right to
contract.85 The FLSA and the other New Deal statutes, which imposed
significant responsibilities and boundaries on the employment relationship, were
for construction services is jointly and severally liable for a violation of this subtitle that is committed
by a subcontractor, regardless of whether the subcontractor is in a direct contractual relationship with
the general contractor.”).
82. The statute also provides that the contractor or subcontractor may seek indemnification from
the other party for payments made to the worker. D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-1012(c) (“Except as otherwise
provided in a contract between the subcontractor and the general contractor, the subcontractor shall
indemnify the general contractor for any wages, damages, interest, penalties, or attorneys’ fees owed as
a result of the subcontractor’s violations of this chapter, unless the violations were due to the lack of
prompt payment in accordance with the terms of the contract between the general contractor and the
subcontractor.”).
83. Courts typically apply one of two versions of multi-factor “economic realities” tests to
determine whether joint employment under the FLSA exists. See Lung, supra note 75, at 317 (“Two
competing versions of the economic realities test emerge from contemporary FLSA cases, mirroring the
tensions in early Anglo-American tort law for distinguishing between employees and independent
contractors.”). In 2017, however, the Fourth Circuit adopted yet another version of the test. See Salinas
v. Commercial Interiors, Inc., 848 F.3d 125, 141 (4th Cir. 2017) (establishing a six-factor test for joint
employment).
84. See, e.g., Orozco v. Plackis, 757 F.3d 445 (5th Cir. 2014); Gilbreath v. Cutter Biological,
931 F.2d 1320, 1324–27, 1330 (9th Cir. 1991).
85. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 65 (1905).
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a congressional rejection of the laissez-faire approach to contracting supported
by Lochner v. New York.86 After Lochner, the Court consistently struck down
states’ minimum wage statutes.87 Scholars suggest, however, that the economic
destabilization of the Great Depression and subsequent changes to the
composition of the Court opened the door for Court approval of the FLSA and
its state law equivalents.88
Subsequent court cases creating the joint employer doctrine of wage and
hour law further “extricated an analysis of the rights of workers and duties of
employers from the strictures of contract law.”89 As a result, employers cannot
simply contract away their duties to workers by using subcontractors; rather, the
courts have developed tests based upon the “economic realities” of the
relationship between the worker and the company in question.90
Risa Goluboff explains that civil rights lawyers at the time understood the
New Deal legislation and the Supreme Court’s sanction of government’s right to
protect and provide for the citizenry as a shift in the legal preeminence of contract
rights.91 Furthermore, on the passing of the New Deal legislation, a Republican
Party member commented: “We cannot go back to a past which countenanced a
widely-exploited labor, a greatly depressed agriculture, an irresponsible Wall
Street; to a past which knew no old-age pensions, no unemployment insurance,
no maximum hours and minimum wages.”92 Nevertheless, Goluboff contends,
“the precise ways in which the doctrinal terrain had shifted, and the
consequences of the shift, lacked the kind of clarity with which we might endow
them today.”93 This shift had both doctrinal significance and normative

86. See Risa Goluboff, The Thirteenth Amendment and the Lost Origins of Civil Rights, 50
DUKE L.J. 1609, 1614 (2001) (“The demise of the Lochner era with the judicial validation of the New
Deal had created space for novel interpretation of individual rights and new doctrines addressing the
role of government in protecting those rights.”); see also W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379,
392 (1937) (“[L]iberty does not withdraw from legislative supervision . . . activity which consists of the
making of contracts, or deny to government the power to provide restrictive safeguards. Liberty implies
the absence of arbitrary restraint, not immunity from reasonable regulations and prohibitions imposed
in the interests of the community.”).
87. See e.g., Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 609 (1936) (holding a New
York minimum wage law unconstitutional); Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 558 (1923)
(finding unconstitutional the District of Columbia’s minimum wage); see also William P. Quigley, “A
Fair Day’s Pay for a Fair Day’s Work”: Time to Raise and Index the Minimum Wage, 27 ST. MARY’S
L.J. 513, 516–22 (1996) (discussing the rise of state and federal minimum-wage legislation and
litigation).
88. See RISA L. GOLUBOFF, THE LOST PROMISE OF CIVIL RIGHTS (2007) [hereinafter
GOLUBOFF, THE LOST PROMISE OF CIVIL RIGHTS].
89. Lung, supra note 75, at 337. Lung traces the development of the joint employer doctrine and
the control theory economic realities tests. Id. at 311–35.
90. See id. at 337.
91. See GOLUBOFF, THE LOST PROMISE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 88.
92. Id. at 23 (quoting C. Gordon Post, Civil Rights and the Role of the Republican Party in the
Post-War World, 2 BILL RTS. REV. 201, 202 (1941).).
93. See GOLUBOFF, THE LOST PROMISE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 88, at 23.
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implications for the protection of workers’ rights beyond the contractual
relationship.
Most scholarly analysis of Lochner and the New Deal’s rejection of its
holding considers the decision’s significance to constitutional jurisprudence and
the balance of powers.94 The shift, however, from a contractual understanding of
the employment relationship to one grounded in federal and state statutory
protections constituted an important change in workers’ ability to seek
improperly withheld wages. An employment relationship that rests solely in the
contractual relationship presumes equal bargaining power between the parties
and thus ignores the employer’s ability to exert significant influence over the
terms of the employment, particularly where the work is low-wage.95 Indeed, the
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the FLSA’s record-keeping requirement
discussed supra reflects the Court’s understanding that any other interpretation
of the statute would create a perverse incentive for employers not to maintain
records in order to cripple workers’ ability to bring claims.96
Indeed, the Supreme Court has explained:
The statute was a recognition of the fact that due to the unequal
bargaining power as between employer and employee, certain segments
of the population required federal compulsory legislation to prevent
private contracts on their part which endangered national health and
efficiency and as a result the free movement of goods in interstate
commerce.97
A court’s failure to consider the wage and hour statutes places workers at the
mercy of a breach of contract jurisprudence that Congress, many state
legislatures, and courts have explicitly rejected.
B. The Contractual Analysis of Wage Theft
In the absence of statutorily prescribed rights, therefore, a shift to a
Lochnerian approach to the employment relationship occurs and contract
principles govern the dispute.98 A breach of contract approach to employment,
94. See, e.g., id. at 22 (“But the end of Lochner’s hegemony destabilized established
understandings of civil rights and in broad strokes transformed crucial balances of governmental
power.”); Azmy, supra note 27, at 1039–40.
95. See, e.g., Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 707 (1945).
96. See Miller v. Food Concepts, Int’l, 2017 WL 1163850, at *19 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 29, 2017)
(recognizing employers’ perverse “incentive to shirk its recording duties in order to avoid liability”).
97. Brooklyn Sav. Bank, 324 U.S. at 706–07.
98. This remains true in states without wage and hour regulations in circumstances in which the
FLSA may not apply. Virginia, for example, provides only very limited statutory wage and hour
protections. It has a relatively bare minimum wage statute that provides that workers not covered by the
FLSA must still receive the federal minimum wage and that courts may penalize employers that violate
the statute by imposing fines between $10 and $200. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 40.1-28.8–28.12 (West,
2014). FLSA applies to enterprises with a $500,000 annual volume of sales or receipts that engaged in
interstate commerce. 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1)(A)(ii) (2012). Courts have broadly interpreted “engaged in
interstate” commerce to include, for example, sending mail across state lines. Thorne v. All Restoration
Services, Inc., 448 F.3d 1264, 1266–67 (11th Cir. 2006) (discussing examples of engaging in interstate
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particularly as it manifests in small claims courts, is less complex and does not
make adjustments for the more vulnerable position of the low-wage worker.99 A
standard breach of contract analysis considers the existence of a bargain to which
the parties have mutually assented and of consideration.100 A court will then turn
to whether either party has substantially breached a material term of the
contract.101 In low-wage worker cases where employers paid employees “under
the table” in cash or did not maintain the statutorily required records, the only
evidence of the hours worked and non-payment may be the worker’s testimony
and may therefore turn entirely on her credibility and that of the testifying
employer. These circumstances make prevailing on a claim substantially more
difficult under a breach of contract analysis than under the federal and state wage
and hour laws.
The next section turns to small claims courts’ relaxed procedural rules and
considers the implications for workers’ ability to prevail in wage and hour cases,
particularly in light of courts’ chronic failure to consider the various protections
described above.
III.
SMALL CLAIMS COURTS’ RELAXED PROCEDURE AND APPLICATION OF THE
LAW
Procedural informality, particularly when compared to the more structured
processes in other state and federal courts, typifies the small claims court
experience. Proponents of procedural informality argue traditional litigation
structures create insurmountable barriers for the largely pro se litigants in small
claims courts.102 However, the relaxed application of rules and sometimes law in
lower courts has yielded mixed results.
In response to a national debate on how to improve justice in “poor people’s
courts,”103 recent scholarship reflects a deepening critique of these courts’
commerce, such as corresponding with and purchasing goods from out-of-state vendors); Guzman v.
Irmadan, Inc., 551 F. Supp. 2d 1368, 1371 (S.D. Fla. 2008) (discussing how the Eleventh Circuit has
interpreted the FLSA’s requirement for an employee to be “engaged in commerce”). Congress has also
extended FLSA coverage to specific groups, such as domestic workers and in-home care providers.
Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Fact Sheet: Proposed Rule Changes Concerning In-Home Care
Industry under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), https://www.dol.gov/whd/flsa/whdfs-NPRMcompanionship.htm [ https://perma.cc/62WU-MYRX].
99. The court’s reasoning in a Civil Advocacy Client’s pro se case for lost wages, discussed in
additional detail infra pp. 1326-27, provides a clear example of a contractual analysis that did not
consider the application of the wage and hour statutes.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. See Jessica K. Steinberg, Demand Side Reform in the Poor People’s Court, 47 CONN. L.
REV. 741, 802–03 (2015) [hereinafter Steinberg, Demand Side Reform in the Poor People’s Court];
Barbara Yngvesson & Patricia Hennesey, Small Claims, Complex Disputes: A Review of the Small
Claims Literature, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 219, 223–24 (1975).
103. “Poor people’s courts” typically refers to courts overseeing matters seeking smaller amounts
of damages and in which the rate of pro se representation is high, such as landlord/tenant court, small
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administration of justice, particularly regarding low-income parties. For
example, Peter Holland analyzed over 4,000 junk debt collection cases in
Maryland and found substantial procedural and substantive justice challenges
faced by unrepresented consumers.104 Likewise, Hannah Lieberman argued that
pro se consumers facing debt-collection proceedings in high-volume state court
dockets often struggle to navigate a minefield of substantive and procedural law
requirements.105 Jessica Steinberg similarly critiqued the distribution of justice
in poor people’s courts, critiqued Civil Gideon as the sole solution, and argued
for changes to the procedural mechanisms.106
Elizabeth MacDowell’s critique of poor people’s courts and their
procedural informality is particularly relevant to the issues raised here. In
particular, MacDowell challenges what she characterizes as small claims courts’
reinforcement of hegemony in ways that further subordinate vulnerable
populations.107 She further critiques the “delegalization” of poor people’s courts
that she contends may lead to low-income litigants’ “loss of rights, limited
autonomy and privacy, and deprivation of voice.”108 Her work proposes reforms
to legal services based upon a counter-hegemonic approach to accessing justice
and relies heavily on analyzing the dynamics in family law courts.109 However,
she recognizes that these same concerns arise in many of the courts frequented
by the poor.110
The following section places these critiques in context by assessing the
procedural differences between small claims courts in the District of Columbia
and Maryland and the state trial courts in those same jurisdictions.
A. Small Claims Courts
Small claims courts in many jurisdictions operate in tandem with courts
handling larger claims in state court systems. The significant distinguishing
characteristic between small claims cases and other state court cases is the
amount in controversy—small claims courts exercise jurisdiction over cases

claims court, and family court. See Russell Engler, Connecting Self-Representation to Civil Gideon:
What Existing Data Reveal About When Counsel is Most Needed, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 37, 39 (2010)
(“Many reports explore the problems facing those with counsel in ‘poor people’s courts,’ typically
handling family, housing, and consumer cases.”); Elizabeth L. MacDowell, Reimagining Access to
Justice in the Poor People’s Courts, 22 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 473, 475 (2015).
104. Peter A Holland, Junk Justice: A Statistical Analysis of 4,400 Lawsuits Filed by Debt
Buyers, 26 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 179, 233 (2014). “Junk debt” refers to largely defaulted unsecured
debt banks purchase for pennies on the dollar and attempt to collect for the full-face value of the debt.
Id. at 182.
105. Hannah Lieberman, Uncivil Procedure: How State Court Proceedings Perpetuate
Inequality, 35 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 257, 259–60 (2016).
106. Steinberg, Demand Side Reform in the Poor People’s Court, supra note 102, at 795.
107. MacDowell, supra note 103, at 535.
108. Id. at 498.
109. Id. at 510.
110. Id. at 523.
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seeking smaller amounts of money in damages.111 For example, in the District of
Columbia, plaintiffs with claims worth up to $10,000 must file their cases in the
lower court. In Maryland, small claims courts exercise jurisdiction over claims
worth less than $5,000.112 In other words, the only reason one wage and hour
complaint is filed in small claims court and another in the state trial court is the
amount of wage theft that has occurred. As discussed below, this difference in
damages sought may have a profound impact on the worker’s practical access to
wage and hour law’s protections.
A National Center for State Courts’ (“NCSC”) nationwide study found two
thirds of state court cases were contract cases and half those contract cases
involved debt collections or landlord-tenant disputes.113 Moreover, 16 percent of
those cases were small claims seeking less than $12,000.114 The report’s
characterization of cases provides insight into employment matters, including
wage and hour claims, adjudicated in state courts. First, the NSCS describes
small claims cases as “lower-value tort or contract disputes in which litigants
may represent themselves without a lawyer.”115 As such, according to the NCSC,
small claims cases typically arise from tort or breach of contract claims. Second,
the report includes a chart listing the types of cases handled in the state courts
that categorizes employment claims as contract disputes. These descriptions
reflect the very phenomena that I have witnessed in my clinic’s cases in small
claims courts: the courts are inclined to consider wage and hour cases within a
breach of contract framework.
B. The Process
The procedural rules governing many small claims courts often differ
substantially from those that apply elsewhere. To illustrate, the District of
Columbia and Montgomery County, Maryland, small claims courts’ procedural
processes are instructive. In order to file a claim in small claims court in D.C., a
plaintiff must complete and file a statement of claim, verification, and notice, all

111. Small claims courts across the county have varying jurisdictional limits on the amount of
damages plaintiff may seek, ranging from $1,500 in Kentucky to $25,000 in Tennessee. See PAULA
HANNAFORD ET AL., THE LANDSCAPE OF CIVIL LITIGATION IN STATE COURTS 13 (2015)
http://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/Research/CivilJusticeReport-2015.ashx
[https://perma.cc/T25R-VG82]. In December 2016, the District of Columbia increased the jurisdictional
amount of the small claims court from $5,000 to $10,000. Court Raises Limit for Cases Filed as Small
Claim, D.C. BAR (Jan. 27, 2017), https://www.dcbar.org/about-the-bar/news/small-claims-cases.cfm
[https://perma.cc/EL69-9UL6]. The increase in the jurisdictional amount to $10,000 means that an
increased number of individual wage theft claims will likely find their way into the lower court. See id.
112. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 4-405 (2017). Maryland also has an intermediate
court between the Small Claims Court and Circuit Court for claims up to $10,000 that permits limited
discovery and other procedural mechanisms, but does not involve the more substantial processes
involved in Circuit Court litigation. MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 3-701 (2018).
113. See HANNAFORD, supra note 111, at iii.
114. See id.
115. See id. at 13.
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of which appear on a single page form.116 The 8 ½ by 11 inch fillable PDF form
contains three lines on which the plaintiff must put a “simple but complete
statement” of her claim.117 The initial filing should also include a copy of the
“contract, promissory note or other instrument on which the claims is based.”118
The Montgomery County Complaint form likewise provides a very limited space
for describing the claim.119 The form also provides a space for the clerk to docket
a case as a (1) contract, (2) tort, (3) detinue, or (4) bad faith insurance claim.120
Given these limited options, it is perhaps unsurprising that courts would simplify
a wage theft claim into a contract claim.
Furthermore, without specific knowledge about the wage and hour laws,
pro se plaintiffs might conceptualize their unpaid wages claims as a breach of
contract. Indeed, in her book based upon an ethnographic study of cases filed in
the poor people’s courts in Boston, Sally Engle Merry observed: “Parties are
rarely aware of the particular rules or doctrines which bear on their case but
instead have a general sense of fairness which derives from conceptions of
property rights, contractual obligations, and rights to person security.”121
Therefore, the language on the complaint form may reinforce a worker’s
assumption that her claim is simply about her employer’s failure to pay the
agreed upon wages, and not the violation of important statutory rights enacted to
protect workers from exploitation.
The case file of a Civil Advocacy Clinic client who originally filed his
claim pro se in a Maryland small claims court provides insight into this
phenomenon. In the space provided on the complaint form, our client wrote, “I
did not get paid no money for my services and loss of earnings at my private
work.”122 Either he or the clerk checked the “contract” box on the form. As the
clinic discovered upon entering the case, his story of lost earnings was complex,
and our pursuit involved determining whether he was an employee or an
independent contractor, and what hours were compensable. These were
important considerations, but the plaintiff lacked knowledge about their
relevance to his case, how to plead or describe these issues in the complaint form,
and how to provide a compelling narrative at his hearing that included these
issues. Thus it was not surprising that he was ultimately unsuccessful when he
appeared pro se before the small claims court judge.
116. D.C. SUP. CT. R. PROC. SMALL CL. & CONCILIATION BRANCH R. 2; see Superior Court of
the District of Columbia, Statement of Claim Form, https://www.dccourts.gov/sites/default/files/201807/Statement-of-Claim-Form-Rev-June-2018-fillable.pdf [https://perma.cc/V2RJ-854G].
117. Id.
118. D.C. SUP. CT. R. PROC. SMALL CLS. & CONCILIATION BRANCH R. 3(a).
119. See District Court of Maryland, Complaint/Application and Affidavit in Support of
Judgement
Form,
http://www.courts.state.md.us/district/forms/civil/dccv001f.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K6YR-CYMH].
120. Id.
121. SALLY ENGLE MERRY, GETTING JUSTICE AND GETTING EVEN 113 (1990) (emphasis
added).
122. Complaint on file with the author.
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Once a worker files a case in either Maryland or the District of Columbia
small claims court and serves the employer, the cases proceed relatively
similarly. The summons contains the initial court date at which all parties are
required to appear.123 That initial hearing is typically the first and possibly only
opportunity for a worker to persuade the court that her employer failed to pay
her wages.
Small claims courts also often lack a formal mechanism for a worker or her
counsel to introduce and explain the legal standards to the court. Moreover, some
jurisdictions do not even require that the persons deciding small claims court
cases have law degrees.124 Where the adjudicator may have limited
understanding of state, federal, statutory, and common law, it is not surprising
that the detailed wage and hour protections described herein receive little
consideration in their courts. Although there may be no rule against filing a pretrial legal memorandum that would allow the plaintiff to surface critical legal
issues before the lower courts, their occurrence is infrequent in many
jurisdictions. Further, it is unlikely that a small claims court judge would have
an opportunity to review such a memorandum before the trial. In contrast, state
trial court judges are more likely to review any pre-trial memoranda filed by the
parties. Indeed, they may require parties file a pre-trial brief to address legal and
factual disputes the court identifies as central to the case.125
For example, in a recent wage and hour case my clinic handled in the D.C.
Superior Court, the court requested that the parties file pre-trial briefs responding
to central questions of law and fact the court had identified in the case.
Specifically, the court asked:
(1) However Defendant or Defendants labeled Plaintiff, whether
for the purposes of the wage laws, the court should make an
independent determination of whether Plaintiff was an
independent contractor or employee. Based on the facts of this
case was Plaintiff an independent contractor or employee?
(2) If Plaintiff was an independent contractor, does Plaintiff have a
claim against these Defendants? If so, what is the claim, and
under what facts and are these Defendant’s [sic] liable?
(3) If Plaintiff was an employee, under what facts and law are these

123. MD. R. R.C.P. DIST. CT. R. 3-112. In the District of Columbia, this information appears on
the Statement of Claim form filed to initiate a case. See SUPERIOR COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA, CIVIL DIVISION SMALL CLAIMS AND CONCILIATION BRANCH INFORMATION HANDBOOK
7 [hereinafter D.C. HANDBOOK].
124. Casey Lesser Mansfield identified courts across the country that do not require the decisionmakers to possess law degrees. Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Disorder in the People’s Court: Rethinking the
Role of Non-Lawyer Judges in Limited Jurisdiction Court Civil Cases, 29 N.M. L. REV. 119, app. 3, at
189–97 (1999).
125. Trial court judges in the District of Columbia and Maryland also have access to law clerks
to assist them in managing their cases and assessing the legal issues.
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Defendants liable for her wages?126
The court clearly understood the importance of exploring the legal basis for
the relationship between the plaintiff and defendant in an unpaid wages claim. If
the plaintiff were an independent contractor, then contract law would apply. On
the other hand, if plaintiff were an employee, then D.C.’s wage and hour laws
and the FLSA would apply. Furthermore, the third question allowed student
attorneys to explain why liability applied to both corporate and individual
company officer defendants named in the case.
Another clinic client’s recent experience in a Maryland small claims court
provides an example of the fundamentally different approach to adjudicating a
wage and hour case in small claims court. Mr. Jones filed his complaint form
and attached copies of a written agreement and text messages with the defendant.
127
The court set a hearing because the damages sought required ex parte proof.
The scheduling order included the following language in the notes section:
“unpaid wages, unclear business relationship and unclear what the damages
are.”128
The initial exchange with the small claims court judge proceeded as
follows:
The Court: First to of all, who is [the defendant]? Who are they to you?
Mr. Jones: A business
The Court: A business that you want?
Mr. Jones: That I work for.
The Court: All right, so you work for them as an employee?
Mr. Jones: Yes
The Court: Or as an independent contractor? What’s the relationship?
Mr. Jones: Well the strange thing is that on the first day in coming in,
they were—putting together a contract. And on the contract . . .
The Court: Do you have a copy of the contract?
Mr. Jones: Yes.129
The Court then asked Mr. Jones questions regarding the contractual nature
of the relationship between himself and his employer.130 The Court ultimately
determined Mr. Jones failed to establish the existence of an enforceable contract
and failed to prove the amount of damages the defendant owed.131 Thus, ten
minutes after Mr. Jones began speaking with the court, he received an order

126. Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law, Salazar v. B&G Cmty. Serv., Inc., No. 2013007652B,
2015 WL 12600919 (D.C. Super. Ct. Sept. 8, 2015).
127. I have altered the client’s name and any identifying details to preserve his confidentiality
and privacy.
128. Transcript on file with author, at 24.
129. Transcript on file with author, at 3–4.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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finding he had not established his right to payment by the defendant. Mr. Jones
appeared to have no knowledge of the wage and hour laws that arguably applied
to his employment, and the judge clearly construed his case as a breach of
contract, to Mr. Jones’s detriment.
C. Mediated Lawlessness
Mediation is typically a very early step in small claims court litigation. In
both the District of Columbia and Maryland, the initial hearing date is largely an
opportunity for mediation rather than an opportunity for a judge to hear the
merits of the case.132 While courts cannot typically mandate that parties agree to
mediate their claims, they exert significant pressure on parties to at least attempt
mediation before proceeding to a trial on the merits of the case.133 Mediation,
however, is another space where the law plays little role in the resolution or
conciliation of a claim. In every mediation in which my clinic students have
participated in D.C. and Maryland small claims courts, the mediators have
specifically stated, by way of introduction, that they are not familiar with the law
of the case and it is not their job to opine on how a court might decide the case.134
In other words, they are typically not concerned with the intricacies of the law;
rather, their job is to help the parties reach an agreement to avoid the inherent
risks of trial. However, the absence of law has the practical impact of placing the
wage and hour cases into a breach of contract framework. The critical questions
become: (1) how many hours the worker claims she worked; (2) how much she
was owed for that work; (3) how much she was actually paid; (4) how much the
employer is willing to pay to make this case go away; and (5) what percentage
of the owed wages the worker is willing to receive in order to avoid the
uncertainty of trial.135 The mediator will likely interpret the absence of a written
contract or any formal documentation about the terms of the employment or
number of hours worked (e.g., timesheets) as a weakness in the case. The
mediator is unlikely to know or understand the employer is statutorily required
to maintain records or that the Mt. Clemens burden-shifting framework applies
in the absence of those records. Indeed, she is unlikely to understand the myriad
of protections afforded workers under state and federal wage and hour statutes
that facilitate workers’ abilities to bring successful claims.
However, the mediation process functions differently outside of the small
claims court procedures. For example, at the trial court level in both Maryland
132. D.C. Small Claims Court Rule 12(a) provides the court “shall make an earnest effort to help
the parties settle their differences by conciliation.” D.C. SUPER. CT. R. PROC. SMALL CLS. &
CONCILIATION BRANCH R. 12(a). In practice, this means “[a]ll cases in which both parties are present
[at the initial hearing] will go to mediation prior to having a trial on the merits of the case.” D.C.
HANDBOOK, supra note 123, at 15.
133. See D.C. HANDBOOK, supra note 123, at 15.
134. In small claims court mediations my clinic has encountered in both D.C. and Maryland,
mediators frequently describe their roles in this manner.
135. This line of inquiry typifies my experience in small claims court mediations.
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and D.C., mediation occurs months into the litigation, after the completion of
discovery and motions practice.136 The courts also require that the parties submit
pre-mediation statements in which the parties identify the factual and legal bases
for their claims.137 As a result, workers have an opportunity to develop not only
the factual basis for their claims before mediation, but also, perhaps more
importantly, to educate the mediator on the relevant legal issues. Indeed, in a
recent wage and hour case my clinic students litigated before the D.C. Superior
Court, the mediator specifically thanked the student attorneys for their
comprehensive mediation statement and indicated he learned a great deal about
wage and hour law that he thought would assist him in the mediation.
Thus, mediation in small claims court frequently falls into the legal pitfalls
described earlier. The mediator’s lack of knowledge about wage and hour laws
makes the negotiation seem precariously close to breach of contract—that is, a
negotiation about how much money was promised, how much is allegedly owed,
and how much the worker is willing to accept in satisfaction of the agreement
and to avoid the risks of trial.
D. What and Who is Lost in Informality
The combination of procedural informality and the absence of nuanced
legal doctrine in small claims court is not based upon the complexity or
importance of the legal matters that appear in that court. Rather, the financial
value of the claim determines which legal forum hears the case. Furthermore,
despite the fee shifting statutes that permit the prevailing party to collect
attorneys’ fees from the employer,138 workers with small dollar claims are rarely
able to secure representation.139 Legal aid organizations and law school clinics
positioned to take cases without concern for the likelihood they will receive
attorneys’ fees are the exception to that rule.
Various scholars, including those already discussed here, have questioned
whether enough justice occurs in poor people’s courts. Wage and hour claims
add an additional layer of complexity to this question. As discussed herein, while
the basic understanding of wage and hour law may seem simple at first blush,
the various protections for workers that have experienced wage theft require that
courts go beyond a contractual analysis and consider nuanced and fact-dependent

136. See Superior Court of the District of Columbia, Mediation and Neutral Case Evaluation
Procedures
and
Confidential
Settlement
Statement
(2017),
https://www.dccourts.gov/sites/default/files/divisionspdfs/committee%20on%20admissions%20pdf/C
SSPackageCivil.pdf [https://perma.cc/4X34-AHFT].
137. See id.
138. See, e.g., 29 U.S. Code § 216(b) (2012) (“The court in such action shall, in addition to any
judgement awarded to the plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney’s fee to be paid by the defendant, and
costs of the action.”).
139. The Civil Advocacy Clinic regularly represent clients with “small-value” claims that legal
services organizations are not able to place with private law firms.
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issues. The failure to do so puts workers at a significant disadvantage—a
disadvantage Congress sought to rectify nearly 80 years ago.
IV.
IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE: NARRATIVE, STOCK STORIES, AND CASE
THEORY
The return to a Lochnerian breach of contract analysis in wage and hour
cases raises a number of potential challenges for workers seeking their unpaid
wages. Given the frequent lack of documentary evidence and the court’s
resulting reliance on oral testimony, credibility determinations become critically
important.140 A worker often must prove what the court construes as a breach of
contract claim based entirely on the worker’s oral testimony, likely in the face of
contradictory oral testimony from the employer. Thus the court’s reliance on
witness credibility determinations may make it difficult for the worker to meet
the burden of proof in small claims court litigation.
It is also more likely the employer will be able to produce witnesses whose
testimony will corroborate the employer’s version of the facts. An employer
might convince or coerce current employees to testify for them, while workers
experience significant difficulty in convincing their co-workers to do the same
on their behalf.141 Moreover, even if a worker can find a former employee who
would consider testifying against their former employer, the potential witness
may be unwilling to take time away from their current jobs and lose pay for those
hours to prepare for and testify in court.
In order for workers to increase the likelihood they will prevail in a wage
theft claim, they must move past the basic credibility determination as the
determining factor in a case. To do so, it is necessary to consider the role of stock
stories and the potential for a compelling narrative and case theory.
A. Stock Stories
Where all the evidence is testimonial and therefore narrative in nature, there
is an increased possibility the court will rely on stock stories and stereotypes to
fill in any factual gaps.142 Those stories will also likely influence the court’s
assessment of witnesses’ credibility.143 Stock stories are the familiar stories that
dictate the way we view the world and inform categories our minds create to
140. Many workers who experience wage theft received payments in cash, did not fill out time
sheets, and have little documentary evidence of their employment experience.
141. For example, in a prior Civil Advocacy Clinic wage and hour case, the defendant put several
current employees on the stand as witnesses. The court, however, expressed significant reservation about
potential witness bias and therefore discounted their testimony. Reyes-Diaz v. Marble Movers (transcript
on file with author).
142. See Gerald P. López, Lay Lawyering, 32 UCLA L. REV. 1, 3 (1984) (explaining how stock
stories “help us interpret the everyday world”).
143. See, e.g., Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Color of Truth: Race and the Assessment of Credibility,
1 MICH. J. RACE & L. 261, 316 (1996) (discussing the role of stereotypes in credibility determinations).
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make sense of what we see and hear.144 They are the foundation of our
understanding of the world and form our assumptions about how it operates.145
According to Gerald López, however, they also have the potential to “disguise
and distort” the truth.146 They have the power to shape mindset, which is “the
bundle of presuppositions, received wisdoms, and shared understandings against
a background of which legal and political discourse takes place.”147 López
explains that problem solving through persuasion requires we “understand and
manipulate the stock stories the other person uses in order to tell a plausible and
compelling story. . . that moves that person to grant the remedy we want.”148
Stock stories, particularly racialized stock stories, may create unanticipated
hurdles for certain workers to recover their wages without the more nuanced
legal protections of the wage and hour laws described above. Some stock stories
may actually help workers. For example, the stock story of the exploited
immigrant low-wage worker whose employer capitalized on her vulnerable
immigration status may help a worker convince a court to believe her wage theft
allegations. To illustrate, Leticia Saucedo and Maria Cristina Morales’s work
explores the stock stories of Latin workers as enduring difficult workplace
conditions in order to provide for their families.149 In contrast, the stock stories
of African American low-wage workers may result in negative racial stereotypes
that often characterize the African American poor as uninterested in or unwilling
to work.150
B. Narrative & Case Theory
Scholars and practitioners have long-recognized the role of narrative in
litigation, in both written and oral advocacy.151 Lawyers are storytellers, tasked
with crafting persuasive narratives and counter-narratives that compel a factfinder to believe their version of the facts.152 In addition, Delgado identifies

144. See ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 47 (2000).
Richard Delgado’s work encouraging counter-narratives explores the relationship between the stock
story, the counter-narrative, and their power to destroy “the bundle of presuppositions, received
wisdoms, and shared understandings against a background of which legal and political discourse takes
place.” See Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH.
L. REV. 2411, 2413 (1989).
145. See Coleman, Disrupting the Discrimination Narrative, supra note 27, at 57.
146. López, supra note 142, at 3.
147. Delgado, supra note 144, at 2413.
148. López, supra note 142, at 3.
149. Leticia M. Saucedo & Maria Cristina Morales, Voices Without Law: The Border Crossing
Stories and Workplace Attitudes of Immigrants, 21 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 641, 650–52 (2012).
150. See, e.g., Coleman, Rendered Invisible, supra note 10.
151. See, e.g., Jeremiah Donovan, Some Off-the-Cuff Remarks About Lawyers as Storytellers, 18
VT. L. REV. 751, 762 (1994) (“As lawyers, we are storytellers.”); Thomas Ross, The Richmond
Narratives, 68 TEX. L. REV. 381, 385 (1989) (“Stories and storytellers pervade the legal culture.”).
152. Delgado, supra note 144, at 2414.
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counter-storytelling as the cure for challenging mindset or stock stories,
particularly those that explicitly or implicitly reinforce subordination.153
In small claims courts, oral storytelling often provides all or most of the
evidence presented in the case.154 As such, this narrative is typically the worker’s
only opportunity to prove her case by engaging the stock story—either working
with or against it—and tying the narratives to the substantive legal concepts that
move the court away from a breach of contract analysis.
This process of connecting narrative—both storytelling and counterstorytelling—to the legal concepts is the work of case theory.155 Case theory
weaves together the factual theory, legal theory, and the remedy sought to “tie[]
as much of the evidence as possible into a coherent and credible whole.”156 While
narrative alone may be compelling and even persuasive, it falls short when it
fails to intersect with the legal principles that a party wants the court to use in
reaching a decision.157
Binny Miller’s work on case theory is instructive. She aptly cautions
against a construction of case theory too closely tied to the attorney’s
understanding of the case and devoid of the client’s lived experiences.158 Miller
argues that too often academics’ conceptualization of case theory seems distant
from the rich details of the client’s life that make those theories more
compelling.159 In this way, “lawyers can see case theory as stories that rely on
the law.”160
The case theory should ultimately respond to the question: “What is this
case about, counselor?” As such, an opening statement should include a clear
articulation of the case theory or theories the party intends to prove. The opening
statements in the small claims court and subsequently in the trial court in the
Sonia Morales case discussed supra provide insight into the importance of

153. Delgado, supra note 144, at 2436–37.
154. Small claims courts typically do not include a discovery process. In D.C., for example, the
rules do not contemplate the parties engaging in a discovery process, but may, “[f]or good cause shown,
and with due regard for the expeditions and informal nature of the proceedings,” authorize a party to
pursue discovery. See D.C. SUPER. CT. R. PROC. SMALL CLS. & CONCILIATION BRANCH R. 10.
155. Narrative and case theory are critical element of lawyering taught in law school clinical
programs. See, e.g., Margaret Moore Jackson, Confronting “Unwelcomeness” From the Outside: Using
Case Theory to Tell the Stories of Sexually-Harassed Women, 14 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 61 (2007);
Binny Miller, Give Them Back Their Lives: Recognizing Client Narrative in Case Theory, 93 MICH. L.
REV. 485 (1995) [hereinafter Miller, Give Them Back Their Lives]; Binny Miller, Teaching Case
Theory, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 293 (2002).
156. Miller, Give Them Back Their Lives, supra note 155, at 492.
157. Miller, Give Them Back Their Lives, supra note 155, at 492–93. Miller explains that a case
theory contains both a legal theory and a factual theory. The former is “a legal framework developed by
a lawyer from interpretation, analysis, and expansion of legal rules and standards,” while the latter is
“the party’s ‘story’ justifying relief under the legal theory.” Id. (citing MARILYN J. BERGER, ET AL.,
PRETRIAL ADVOCACY: PLANNING, ANALYSIS, AND STRATEGY 18–19 (1988)).
158. Id. at 526–27.
159. Id. at 554–55.
160. Id. at 555.
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narrative and case theory in effectively framing a case for the judge.161 This
includes communicating not just the compelling narrative but also the
relationship between that narrative and the wage and hour laws.
C. Comparing Case Theories
The opening statements presented in Sonia Morales’s small claims court
and circuit court trials provide useful examples of what may be lost when counsel
do not adequately connect the factual theory, legal theory, and remedy to create
compelling and persuasive case theories. In Sonia Morales’s small claims court
trial, the student attorney’s opening statement proceeded as follows:
Sonia Morales was hired and employed by Marvelous Maids Service to
work as a driver and a housecleaner. The evidence will show that she
worked long days and was paid between $65.00 to $67.50 per day, often
amounting to less than the federal minimum wage. Ms. Morales will
testify that she was not paid for all the hours that she worked, nor was
she paid for the hours that she worked beyond a 40-hour workweek, as
required by state and federal law. Ms. Morales will also testify that she
was not required to fill out timesheets, was sometimes paid in cash, and
other times paid by company check, but not payroll checks, and that the
defendant willfully violated Maryland wage and hour laws, Maryland
labor and employment laws, Maryland wage and payment collection
laws, and the Fair Labor Standards Act. Accordingly, we respectfully
request that this court grant Ms. Morales back pay wages and overtime,
penalties, liquidated damages, and trouble damages, pursuant to
Maryland Labor and Employment, Section 3507, B1, the Fair Labor
Standards Act, Section 216B, and the Maryland Wage and Payment,
Section 305-7-B1. Thank you.162
The case theory presented in this statement falls short and ultimately proved
fatal to the plaintiff’s claim in the small claims court. First, the narrative, while
succinct, does not weave together the factual theories sufficient to create a
compelling story of the plaintiff’s workplace exploitation. Second, it mentions
the statutes violated and the remedies sought, but does little to engage the various
legal standards discussed supra that would bolster the plaintiff’s claim. Thus,
while the court may have heard the references to statutes, since the narrative
elements of the case theory focused so heavily on facts that mirrored a more
straight-forward breach of contract claim, the court applied a watered-down
analysis that referenced wage and hour laws, but did not actually engage those
laws.
Moreover, the court did not consider whether the client was an employee,
as the student attorneys argued, or an independent contractor, as the defendant
argued. The judge’s assessment of the burden of proof in the case clearly did not

161.
162.

See supra Introduction.
Transcript on file with author, at 2–3.

2019]

WAGE THEFT IN LAWLESS COURTS

1335

include the Mt. Clemens burden-shifting analysis. Instead, the court retreated to
a determination of whether the client could prove through her testimony that her
factual theory of the number of hours she worked and the pay she received was
more likely true than not, when faced with counter-testimony from the
defendant.163
In the Circuit Court de novo appeal, the student attorney’s opening
statement proceeded as follows:
We are here today because the defendant engaged in the business of
exploitation. Today, the evidence will prove three key points that will
demonstrate that the defendant engaged in illegal employment practices
to the detriment of Ms. Morales during her employment at Marvelous
Maids Services. First, the evidence will show that that MMS employed
Ms. Morales as an hourly employee, not a contracted employee. Further,
the evidence will show that Ms. Morales worked an average of fifty to
sixty hours per week, and was underpaid and never paid overtime . . . .
Under the Maryland Wage and Hour law, employers are required to pay
the minimum wage of $7.25 per hour. Further, hourly employees are
entitled to one and half times the hourly rate for every hour worked over
forty hours in a single work week, for a total of $10.87 per hour in
overtime pay. Evidence will demonstrate that Ms. Morales was in fact
an hourly worker, underpaid, and never paid overtime compensation.
Though employees have the initial burden of proving they worked a
certain number of hours, their testimony of their recollection of the
amount of hours worked is sufficient, and the Supreme Court has held
that the burden then shifts to the employer to come forward with
evidence of the number of hours worked, or the evidence that negates
the reasonableness of the inference drawn from the employee’s
evidence.164
Here, the case theory articulated through the opening statement does
substantially more work to situate Sonia’s experiences within the exploited
worker narrative, while also bringing explicit wage and hour law, both statutory
and judicially-created, into the courtroom. As an initial matter, this case theory
incorporates several legal issues, including the independent contractor or
employee question, the minimum wage and overtime standards, and the Mt.
Clemens burden-shifting framework.
This case theory fails, however, to position Sonia’s story within the legal
framework.165 The narrative and the law seem disjointed, rather than

163. Id. at 48–49.
164. Id at 6–7. At this point, the judge interrupted the student attorney with questions about the
application of the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Mt. Clemens Pottery to the alleged violations of state
wage and hour claims before the court. Id.
165. One of the challenges of clinical pedagogy is working with students to produce their best
work, without taking over ownership. While I worked with both sets of students in these cases to develop
strong case theories and opening statements, I did not write them for the student attorneys and instead
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interconnected. Instead of bogging down the end of the narrative with a
complicated explanation of the law, the case theory might have proceeded as
follows:
We are here today because the defendant engaged in the business of
exploitation. Today, the evidence will demonstrate the defendant
engaged in employment practices that violated multiple sections of the
federal and state wage and hour statutes. First, the evidence will show
that that MMS employed Ms. Morales as an hourly domestic employee,
not an independent contractor, and she is therefore subject to the
protections of the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Maryland Wage
Payment and Collection Act and the Maryland Minimum Wage Act.
Further, the evidence will show that Ms. Morales worked an average of
fifty to sixty hours per week, received only $6.50 to $6.75 per hour—
below the minimum wage of $7.50 per hour—and never received time
and a half as overtime compensation in violation of Maryland’s statutes.
Ms. Morales’s testimony of the number of hours she worked and the
amount she was paid will meet her burden to demonstrate her claims by
a “just and reasonable inference”—the standard articulated by the
Supreme Court. The defendant will then shoulder the burden of
providing evidence to negate the reasonableness of this inference. The
evidence will ultimately show that both the corporate defendant, MMS,
and the individual defendant, Mrs. Brown, are liable for their failure to
pay Ms. Morales her hard-earned wages.
This case theory weaves significant legal standards into a comprehensive
narrative. By relying heavily on facts as applied to specific legal standards, it
centers the law in the narrative to deter the fact-finder from applying a breach of
contract analysis.
A comparison of the three case theories above sheds light on the difficulty
of weaving various legal elements into the narrative to create a compelling
argument before the court. This exercise, however, is particularly important in
small claims courts where the intricacies of wage and hour law may go
overlooked in an effort to provide simple and efficient resolution of the claims.
VI.
NORMATIVE RESPONSES FOR PRO SE PARTIES
As discussed in detail above, crafting a compelling narrative and case
theory is a layered and complex process, particularly where the litigant must use
a narrative process to educate the judge about various statutory legal protections.
It is unreasonable to expect a pro se party to engage successfully in this process,
assuming she is even aware of its necessity. Thus, a response requires the

guided them to develop case theories they considered to be persuasive, client-centered, and emotionally
compelling. Imperfection is a typical and expected result of this pedagogy.
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identification of procedural reforms that would better position pro se workers
who pursue their unpaid wages in small claims court.
A. An Argument for Procedural Changes
Why should courts consider specific procedural changes for wage and hour
cases? One might simply argue that any procedural changes that increase courts’
ability to provide justice to the parties are advisable. Of course, the hallmarks of
small claims courts are judicial efficiency and economies of scale that
acknowledge the system’s imperfections.166 However, unlike other types of
cases that small claims courts typically adjudicate,167 wage and hour cases
engage in the important work of vindicating statutes whose enforcement is
critical to workplace regulation.168 State and federal governments engage in
wage and hour enforcement,169 but the statutes’ efficacy depends upon private
enforcement through private attorneys general.170
One way to avoid needing to seek small amounts for each plaintiff in small
claims courts is to use collective and class actions.171 While these procedural
mechanisms may permit large numbers of plaintiffs to pursue their claims jointly
in state or federal court, the pursuit of justice cannot require the availability of
class and collective adjudication. Indeed, not every workplace employs enough
workers for class or collective actions,172 and not every employment lawyer has
the resources to handle complex cases.173 Even where there are enough workers
to pursue a collective or class action and lawyers available to represent them, the
166. See Susan E. Raitt, et al., The Use of Mediation in Small Claims Courts, 9 OHIO ST. J. ON
DISP. RES. 55, 62–63 (1993) (“Small claims court procedures are less expensive, faster, and less formal
than the regular civil litigation process.”) (quoting JOHN A. GOERDT, STATE JUSTICE INSTITUTE, SMALL
CLAIMS AND TRAFFIC COURTS: CASE MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES, CASE CHARACTERISTICS, AND
OUTCOMES IN 12 URBAN JURISDICTIONS 22–23 (1992)); Yngvesson & Hennessey, supra note 102, at,
262 (noting that “rapid and inexpensive processing of small claims” was an early goal of small claims
court.).
167. Small claims courts typically handle cases involving: “1) breach of contract/breach of
warranty, 2) negligence, 3) defective products, 4) intentional misconduct, and 5) violations of statutes
designed to protect consumers.” Raitt, et al., supra note 166, at 57.
168. See Coleman, Exploited at the Intersection, supra note 10 at 216 (discussing Congress’s
adoption of fee-shifting statutes for the FLSA and other “cases involving the vindicating of important
public policy goals”).
169. See id. at 22–23.
170. See id. at 19–25.
171. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2012).
172. Collective actions serve a limited purpose where only a small number of workers join a case.
Indeed, courts have decertified wage and hour collective actions where only a few workers joined the
litigation. See, e.g., Holaway v. Stratasys, Inc., 2013 WL 5787476, at *3 (D. Minn. Oct. 28, 2013)
(decertifying a case involving only three workers).
173. Prior to joining the law school faculty, I practiced wage and hour law and litigated wage and
hour collective action cases. Those cases require a significant expenditure of resources by plaintiffs’
counsel to, for example: (1) keep track of what may be hundreds or thousands of opt-in plaintiffs; (2)
distribute notice of the case to all of the potential workers providing them an opportunity to “opt-in” or
join the case; (3) litigate issues around the language included in the notice; and (4) respond to discovery
issued to the named plaintiffs and often a sub-set of the opt-ins.
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judiciary’s increasing hostility to class actions may create procedural barriers to
enforcement.174
Courts’ explicit discouragement of confidential settlements in wage and
hour cases provides additional evidence of the important public policy goals met
through such cases. Class and collective action wage and hour cases require court
approval of any settlements reached by the parties.175 Many courts also
discourage confidential settlements of individual cases.176
B. Turner v. Rogers: A Framework for Procedural Justice
Critiques of procedural informality raise questions about the quality of
justice administered in high-volume state courts like small claims courts.177 What
does procedural justice require in poor people’s courts? Is it simply providing an
opportunity to be heard, or is something more required? An analysis of these
inquiries is beyond the scope of this article, yet they provide a compelling frame
through which to consider potential remedies to procedural challenges discussed
above.
The Supreme Court’s reasoning in Turner v. Rogers provides an important
backdrop to a consideration of procedural due process in the lower courts.178 In
2011, the Court considered whether a family court provided sufficient process to
a father responding to a complaint of civil contempt for non-payment of child
support.179 The South Carolina Family Court threatened incarceration for civil
contempt of family court orders where the party was able to comply and failed
to do so.180 The father in Turner was subject to an order to pay $51.73 per week
in child support.181 After a number of years marked by periods of irregular
payments, non-payment, and periods of imprisonment ranging from a few days
174. See generally Scott A. Moss & Nantiya Ruan, The Second-Class Class Action: How Courts
Thwart Wage Rights by Misapplying Class Action Rules, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 523 (2012) (discussing
courts’ increasing imposition of procedural barriers to Rule 23 class actions and the misapplication of
those rules to wage and hour collective actions). Large employers may also require workers to sign
arbitration agreements that prohibit them from adjudicating their claims in court or as a class. See, e.g.,
Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018) (upholding enforceability of employment
arbitration agreements); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011) (finding the Federal
Arbitration Act preempts California’s rule on contract unconscionability).
175. See, e.g., Lonny Hoffman & Christian J. Ward, The Limits of Comprehensive Peace: The
Example of the FLSA, 38 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 265, 279 (2017) (“Rule 23 (and its state law
equivalents) already requires the court to sign off on the settlement as fair, reasonable, and adequate.”).
176. See, e.g., Cheeks v. Freeport Pancake House, Inc., 796 F.3d 199 (2d Cir. 2015) (affirming
district court’s refusal to approve a private settlement agreement); Steele v. Staffmark Investments, LLC,
172 F. Supp. 3d 1024, 1030–31 (W.D. Tenn. 2016) (rejecting the inclusion of a confidentiality
agreement in the settlement of a case alleging FLSA violations).
177. See, e.g., Lieberman, supra note 105, at 258 (“Without significant reform, too many of the
generally low-income defendants in these high-volume dockets suffer wholesale denials of justice,
further exacerbating economic inequalities.”).
178. Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431 (2011).
179. Id.
180. Id. at 435.
181. Id. at 436.
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to six months, he appeared pro se before the court in response to a motion for
contempt based on a $5,728.76 arrearage in payments.182 In a five-minute
proceeding in which the court only asked him if there was “anything you want
to say,” the court found the father in willful contempt of the child support order
and sentenced him to 12 months’ imprisonment.183 The family court made no
express findings regarding his ability to pay the arrearage, and the father did not
volunteer any specific information on that issue.184 While the Court found the
Due Process Clause does not require the provision of counsel at a civil contempt
proceeding, it reasoned that due process considerations called for procedural
safeguards for unrepresented parties in such cases.185 Specifically, the Court
found the family court must provide:
(1) notice to the defendant that his “ability to pay” is a critical issue in
the contempt proceeding; (2) the use of a form (or the equivalent) to
elicit relevant financial information; (3) an opportunity at the hearing
for the defendant to respond to statements and questions about his
financial status, (e.g., those triggered by his responses on the form); and
(4) an express finding by the court that the defendant has the ability to
pay.186
The Court was careful in Turner to narrow the requirement of these
procedural safeguards to circumstances involving unrepresented parties and the
potential deprivation of liberty.187 Nevertheless, as Jessica Steinberg has aptly
argued, they may provide a starting place for determining the types of procedural
safeguards that would better enable parties to experience procedural justice in
other civil contexts.188 Moreover, while courts often carve out certain procedural
protections for cases involving a deprivation of liberty, they do not necessarily
afford those same protections to cases in which a potential deprivation of liberty
does not arise.
Many of the procedural safeguards contemplated in Turner would also
better position workers to pursue their substantive wage and hour rights through

182. Id.
183. Id. at 437; see also Judith Resnick, Comment, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T
v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 160 (2011) (noting
the trial judge “spent less than five minutes, made no findings on the record, . . and sent Turner to jail
for twelve months”).
184. Turner, 564 U.S. at 437.
185. Id. at 448.
186. Id. at 447–48.
187. See Steinberg, supra note 102, at 794 (“Turner offers important constitutional support for
procedural and judicial reform, but its reforms are limited and its holding applies only to civil contempt
cases.”).
188. See id. at 789. Steinberg utilizes Turner v. Rogers as a launching pad for recommended
procedural, evidentiary, and judicial reforms in poor people’s courts. She argues that strategies for court
reform that attempt to increase access to justice through the provision of counsel—either through
unbundled legal services or the adoption of “civil Gideon”—are insufficient and produce anemic results.
Id. She further contends that the systematic adoption of demand-side reforms would more adequately
address the justice gap in the lower courts. Id.
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litigation. Their adaptation to the wage and hour context would create
mechanisms that incorporate the various legal protections discussed herein.
1. Notice of Basic Wage Rights
When a plaintiff prepares to file a claim in small claims court, the Court
should provide her basic information on her rights under the state wage and hour
laws. This basic information would include the minimum wage and the right to
time and a half for hours worked over forty in a week. In addition, she should
receive an explanation of the difference between an employee and an
independent contractor, and the potential for burden-shifting where the employer
fails to maintain proper employment records. In jurisdictions that have explicitly
adopted the FLSA’s extension of liability to directors and supervisors, workers
should also learn about their ability to pursue their claims against both
individuals and companies. This information would better position the pro se
party to navigate the complicated legal terrain necessary to prevail on wage and
hour claims.
A second option for providing workers information about their wage and
hour rights could involve the creation of employee rights resource centers to give
free legal information to workers and employers. It might also provide referral
information to legal services organizations that provide workers’ rights trainings
programs that educate workers about their wage and hour rights. In the growing
absence of unionized workplaces,189 worker centers have become critical spaces
for empowering workers through education and advocacy.190 Relying solely on
these centers, however, may exclude certain low-wage workers, given that most
worker centers serve largely immigrant populations.191
2. Specific Pleading Forms and Automatic Discovery
Pro se plaintiffs alleging wage theft would benefit from specific pleading
forms that allow them to check boxes as well as provide a narrative explaining

189. See Coleman, Rendered Invisible, supra note 10, at 88 (discussing increasing reduction in
unionized workplaces); see also REBECCA THIESS, ECON. POLICY INS. BRIEFING PAPER, THE FUTURE
OF WORK: TRENDS AND CHALLENGES FOR LOW-WAGE WORKERS 13 (Apr. 27, 2012),
http://www.epi.org/files/2012/bp341-future-of-work.pdf [https://perma.cc/H3UB-7HV2] (“Union
coverage has fallen dramatically over the last 30 years, with the share of unionized wage and salary
workers dropping 0.4 percent per year from 1979–2010.”); Shannon Gleeson, From Rights to Claims:
The Role of Civil Society in Making Rights Real for Vulnerable Workers, 43 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 669,
690 (2009) (“[O]verall unionization has been steadily declining in the United States . . . .”); Janice Fine,
Worker Centers: Entering a New Stage of Growth and Development, NEW. LAB. F. (Oct. 2011),
https://newlaborforum.cuny.edu/2011/10/12/working-centers-entering-a-new-stage-of-growth-anddevelopment [https://perma.cc/M7T2-ZAUH] (discussing declining union density).
190. See Coleman, Rendered Invisible, supra note 10, at 88–89 (discussing the increasing
importance of worker centers in protecting workers’ rights).
191. See id., at 88–92 (discussing the increased importance of worker centers in educating
workers about their wage and hour rights and the resulting troubling absence of black workers from
those spaces).
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their claims. The pleading could provide plaintiffs an opportunity to identify
whether their claims involve, for example: (1) minimum wage violations; (2)
non-payment of wages; (3) overtime pay violations; (4) failure to pay tips
properly; and (5) independent contractor violations. The form could also provide
a space in which the worker could check a box indicating whether the employer
posted the statutorily-required notices regarding wage and hour rights in the
workplace.
This form would serve multiple important functions that would greatly
improve workers’ ability to bring successful wage and hour claims in small
claims courts. First, it would allow the court to see, from the onset of the case,
the various issues the plaintiff intends to raise. Many small claims court judges
relax the adversarial mechanisms in their courts and actively engage with
unrepresented parties.192 Rather than relying entirely on the narrative provided
by the parties, they often ask questions, either to clarify an issue, or to elicit
information about a legal element of the claim that may be unknown to the pro
se party. A wage claim form would alert the judge which areas of the wage and
hour laws are relevant to the worker’s claim and would therefore position the
judge to inquire further, if necessary. The form might also alert the worker to the
types of information—and, therefore, evidence—that would be relevant to her
claim for lost wages. As a result, she might take the time to gather additional
evidence that would support her claim—evidence she may not have realized
would be relevant before she filed the complaint.
In addition, in those small claims courts that do not typically permit
discovery, the courts should provide for automatic discovery in wage and hour
claims.193 Specifically, they should require both parties to provide all documents
concerning the employment relationship alleged in the complaint. This process
would allow the worker to ascertain whether the employer has retained the
statutorily required documents. If the employer fails to produce documents, then
the court would apply the Mt. Clemens burden-shifting framework to the case.194

192. See Jessica Steinberg, Adversary Breakdown and Judicial Role Confusion in Small Court
Case Civil Justice, 2016 B.Y.U. L. REV. 899, 938 (2016) [hereinafter Steinberg, Adversary Breakdown].
193. For example, the D.C. Small Claims Court currently only permits discovery by application
of a party and for good cause shown. See D.C. SUPER. CT. R. PROC. SMALL CLS. & CONCILIATION
BRANCH 10 (“For good cause shown, and with due regard for the expeditions and informal nature of the
proceedings, the Court may authorize a party to proceed with discovery . . . .”). The court rules, however,
contemplate the possibility that the court could initiate discovery “if the interest of justice appears to
require it.” See id. at 10(b) (“If any claim of any party is unliquidated, or if the interest of justice appears
to require it, the Court shall, in the course of the pretrial inquired provided for in Small Claims Rule
12(a), elicit from the parties or their attorneys a statement as to the necessity for discovery proceedings
in order to accomplish just and expedition determination of the cause. Upon good cause appearing, he
shall order or authorize such proceedings pursuant to Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure 26–37 as
the interests of justice seem to require, and shall continue the cause for such period of time as may seem
reasonably necessary.”).
194. See supra at 1315-16.
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3. Opportunity to Provide Specific Information at the Hearing
Court should provide wage and hour claimants the opportunity to provide
specific information regarding their claims at their hearings. For example, they
should have an opportunity to discuss the terms of their employment in order to
demonstrate they were employees and not independent contractors. They should
have the opportunity to provide evidence that they meet the “economic realities
test” by demonstrating (1) the ways in which the employer controlled them; (2)
their lack of opportunities to make a profit or a loss from the work; (3) the
absence of their capital investment into the work; (4) the level of skill necessary
to perform the jobs; (5) that the jobs they completed were integral to the
business’s operations; and (6) the permanence of their relationships with the
employer.195 Given that these factors are not necessarily relevant to whether an
employee worked a certain number of hours and whether she received full
compensation for those hours, a court that is not sensitive to the plaintiff’s need
to establish an employment relationship, rather than a contractual relationship,
would not necessarily allow the plaintiff time to present the necessary evidence.
4. Express Findings by the Court
Courts should also make certain express findings in wage and hour cases.
First, courts should explicitly find whether the worker is an employee or an
independent contractor, and provide an explanation for that determination.
Second, the court should determine whether the defendant failed to maintain the
required records such that the Mt. Clemens burden-shifting framework applies to
the case. These two basic findings would significantly impact workers’ ability to
demonstrate violations of the wage and hour statutes.
5. Collection
Workers often experience significant difficulty in collecting judgments
from employers, particularly smaller employers whose assets may be more
difficult to locate. Wages, however, may be recoverable with the institution of
certain processes that make critical information available to plaintiffs in wage
and hour cases. Specifically, courts should require that employers provide certain
financial information to plaintiffs, such as the identification of bank accounts and
a list of real property assets, as part of the mandatory discovery discussed above.
While court rules often permit parties to seek these documents through postjudgement discovery or submitting to oral examination,196 defendants evading
payment may fail to respond to discovery requests at that juncture.
In an effort to aid judgment collection efforts, the District of Columbia has
enacted a rule requiring judges to order the defendant to appear in court to testify
about his financial status and ability to pay the motion. Rule 18 provides:
195.
196.

Means & Seiner, supra note 76, at 1526.
See, e.g., MD. R. R.C.P. DIST. CT. R. 3-633.
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In all cases where the judgment is founded in whole or in part on a claim
for wages or personal services, the judge shall, upon written or oral
motion of the party obtaining judgment, order the appearance of the
party against whom such judgment has been entered, but not more often
than once each 4 weeks, for oral examination under oath as to his
financial status and his ability to pay such judgment, and the judge shall
make supplementary orders as may seem just and proper to effectuate
the payment of the judgment upon reasonable terms, provided, that the
term “personal services” does not apply to a litigant whose claim is
based upon professional services.197
C. Judicial Trainings
All states require newly-elected or appointed judges to participate in some
form of orientation.198 More than half of states also require judges to take
continuing education courses that may last from a few days to three weeks.199
While much of the available training seems to focus on more general procedural
and ethical issues,200 judicial training on wage and hour laws would position
small claims judges to properly assess the various legal issues discussed above.
Where pro se parties201 experience difficulty in telling their stories with sufficient
detail to address the multiple intersecting legal issues relevant to wage and hour
claims, the court’s ability to identify those issues and elicit testimony or evidence
on them would better position workers to prevail on their claims.202
CONCLUSION
The FLSA and its state law counterparts create significant protections for
workers that explicitly remove wage and hour disputes from the realm of contract
law. These protections, however, are only as strong as their application in court.
Small claims courts, by design, involve simplified procedures to efficiently
process large numbers of cases, many with pro se parties, that rarely delve into

197.
198.

D.C. SUPER. CT. R. PROC. SMALL CLS. & CONCILIATION BRANCH R. 18.
DEP’T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK, JUDGES AND HEARING
OFFICERS (April 13, 2018), https://www.bls.gov/ooh/legal/judges-and-hearing-officers.htm#tab-4
[https://perma.cc/M9RP-PDHL].
199. Id.
200. For example, the judicial training courses listed on the National Judicial College website are
largely procedural, and the few that address substantive law do not include wage and hour law. See
Courses, NAT’L JUD. C. (2019) www.judges.org/2018/courses [https://perma.cc/3TKQ-2U55].
201. Indeed, such trainings would also aid represented parties by creating an atmosphere in which
the judge expects counsel to discuss legal issues relevant to the proper adjudication of wage and hour
cases.
202. Hannah Lieberman has advocated for judicial training and rules that would “permit litigants
to offer narrative testimony and encourage questions from the judge to elicit information that is germane
to claims and defenses.” See Lieberman, supra note 105, at 270. Jessica Steinberg has likewise argued
that judges in lower courts should abandon the passive arbiter approach and instead engage in more
active judging in order to permit pro se parties to properly pursue their substantive legal rights. See
Steinberg, Adversary Breakdown, supra note 192.
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the nuances of the law. In wage theft cases, however, these nuances are
paramount for protecting exploited workers. The efficiencies of the court may
therefore create substantial roadblocks for plaintiffs. This reality of how the law
actually functions in courts has significant implications for the strategies
employed by lawyers in these cases. The development of a succinct and
persuasive case theory that not only presents a compelling narrative, but also ties
the narrative to the statutory legal elements, is critically important in wage theft
cases pursued in small claims courts. Furthermore, given the number of pro se
parties in poor people’s courts, courts should consider procedural changes they
can implement to protect the substantive wage and hour rights workers pursue in
their courts. The adaptation of mechanisms identified in Turner v. Rogers would
permit pro se plaintiffs to better benefit from the wage and hour laws’
protections.

